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THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL
DISTRICTS: SILICON VALLEY, ROUTE 128, AND COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE
Ronald J. Gilson*
Policy makers have rediscovered the concept of industrial districts, especially
high technology industrial districts.  It is easy to understand the attraction.  The threat of
continued loss of well paying manufacturing jobs to low wage countries has become a
central political issue in the United States and other developed nations and a rallying cry
for trade protectionists.   The experience of regions like Silicon Valley, and what has
come to be known as the “Third Italy,”1 holds out the promise of the brass ring: new jobs
with high wages.2  Hoping that a similar name presages a similar outcome, regions
christen themselves Silicon Mountain, Silicon Alley, Silicon Forest, or Silicon Glen.
                                               
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, and Marc & Eva Stern Professor
of Law and Business, Columbia University School of Law.  I am grateful to Stanford Law School, and the
Columbia University School of Law/Sloane Foundation Project on Corporate Governance, for financial
support of the project of which this article is part, and to the Rockefeller Foundation whose award of a
residency at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center so greatly contributed to the completion of this
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history of the California law on restraints of trade.  Joseph Bankman, Victor Goldberg, Jeffrey Gordon,
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1 The term “Third Italy” distinguishes a number of successful regions largely in north and central Italy from
“the impoverished South and the old industrial triangle of Genoa, Turin, and Milan.”  CHARLES F. SABEL,
FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATION AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES, IN REVERSING INDUSTRIAL
DECLINE? INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND POLICY IN BRITAIN AND HER COMPETITION 17, 22 (Paul Hirst &
Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1989).  Joseph Bankman, Victor Goldberg, Jeffrey Gordon, Alan Hyde, and Lance
Liebman provided helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2 In 1996, Silicon Valley added some 50,000 jobs, while average wages grew at five times the national
average.  In the same year, the average wage in Silicon Valley totaled $43,510, compared with $28,040
nationally (in 1995 dollars).  Jonathan Markoff, A Gold Rush From Software Reinvigorated Silicon Valley,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1997, p.C1, col. 1.  Wage rates in Italy’s Emilia-Romagna are twice the national
average, and went from 17th out of Italy’s 21 regions in 1973 to 2nd in 1986.  Bennett Harrison, Industrial
Districts: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 26 REGIONAL STUDIES 469, 472 (1992).
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The same phenomenon has also rekindled academic interest in the subject.  The
concept of an industrial district – the spatial concentration of firms in the same or a
related industry – dates to Alfred Marshall writing in 1890.3  Marshall developed the
concept of (and, unfortunately, the phrase) agglomeration economies to describe the input
scale economies external to the firm but internal to the region that are available to any
firm as a result of the proximity of similar firms.  The input is available more cheaply
within the region because of the spatial concentration of users.  Marshall used the labor
market as an example of this increasing returns phenomenon.  As more firms in an
industry locate in a region, workers with the skills demanded by the industry follow.  The
process is self-reinforcing: as more skilled workers locate in a region, other firms in the
industry follow.  The geographic concentration of firms results in a lower cost of skilled
labor.
Recent scholarship, styled the “new economic geography,”4 continues Marshall’s
stress on increasing returns in explaining industrial clustering, but with two important
shifts in emphasis.  First, reflecting the interest in high technology industrial districts
evoked by their success, central attention is given to knowledge as an input subject to
agglomeration economies.  Second, more attention is paid to the dynamics that give rise
to industrial districts, rather than to the equilibrium conditions that describe their
existence.  The result has been a recognition that industrial districts are path dependent –
an industrial district’s location may result not from the invisible hand of efficiency, but
                                               
3 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 267-77 (8th ed. 1920, originally published in 1890).
4 Paul Krugman, Space:  The Final Frontier, 12 J. ECON. PERSPEC. 161 (1998).  See Masahisa Fujita &
Jacques-Francois Thisse, Economics of Agglomeration, 10 JAP. & INTN’L ECON 339, 341 (1996).
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from “the details of the seemingly transient and adventitious circumstances”5 associated
with its origin.  To understand the development and success of high technology industrial
districts, “history matters.”6
In this article, I analyze a factor bearing on the location and development of high
technology industrial districts that has not received attention in the economic geography
literature: the legal infrastructure that supports the agglomeration economies said to give
rise to and sustain regional concentrations of high technology firms.7  The special
importance of legal rules to high technology industrial districts results from the shift in
emphasis on the input subject to increasing returns. The mechanisms and efficiency of
knowledge transfer are shaped by the legal rules relating to intellectual property and,
because at least tacit knowledge is most effectively transferred by the individuals in
whom it is embedded, by the legal rules relating to employee mobility.  Thus, I will
argue, the legal infrastructure prominently influences the dynamics of high technology
industrial districts.
I take as the context of my analysis the juxtaposition of two familiar U.S. high
technology industrial districts: Silicon Valley on the San Francisco peninsula, and Route
128 outside of Boston.  The comparison has two important advantages.  First, it allows
me the benefit of Annalee Saxenian’s deep description of the history and operation of
                                               
5 Paul A. David & Joshua Rosenbloom, Marshallian Factor Market Externalities and the Dynamics of
Industrial Location, 28 J. URB. ECON. 349, 368 (1996).
6 Fujita & Thisse, supra note 4, at 371.
7 Alan Hyde, Silicon Valley's Efficient Abolition of Trade Secrets, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 103
(Conf. Vol., The Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, May, 1998), also
addresses the relation between legal rules and the operation of the high tech industry.  While our emphasis
differs, I have greatly benefited from Professor Hyde’s interesting work.
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these districts, as well as her assessment of the reason for Silicon Valley’s continuing
success and Route 128’s ultimate decline.8
Second, the comparison provides a natural experiment bearing on competing
explanations for the two districts’ differential performance.  Consistent with the new
economic geography, Saxenian stresses the comparative efficiency of inter-firm
knowledge transfer in Silicon Valley.  In her account, knowledge is transferred between
firms by the movement of employees between employers and to start-ups.  She attributes
Silicon Valley’s efficiency advantage, and the resulting performance difference, to
differences in the two regions’ business cultures.  Silicon Valley’s culture of mobility –
the constant penetration of local firms’ open architecture by job-hopping engineers and
the corresponding bias against vertical integration – is much more conducive to the
regional dispersal of innovative knowledge than Route 128’s culture of career long
employment supported by more traditionally organized, vertically integrated firms.
I suggest here a different explanation for the two districts’ differing efficiency at
transferring knowledge between firms: differences in the district’s legal infrastructure,
that is, in the legal rules governing employee mobility and, in particular, the rules
governing the enforceability of employee post-employment covenants not to compete.
Such covenants are promises by employees not to compete with their employer, whether
by working for a competitor or by starting a new business, for a period of time after
employment terminates.  In my account, the legal rules governing employee mobility are
a causal antecedent of Saxenian’s construction of a Silicon Valley business culture that
                                               
8 ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND
ROUTE 128 (1994).
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supports job hopping and a Route 128 business culture that discourages it.  The legal
rules form one of the poles around which  the shape of the business culture precipitates.
The natural experiment results from the fact that Silicon Valley and Route 128
have different legal rules governing employment mobility.  Post-employment covenants
not to compete have the potential to seriously restrict the movement of employees
between existing firms and to start-ups and, hence, to seriously restrict employee
transmitted knowledge spillovers.  California prohibits covenants not to compete;
Massachusetts enforces them.
My focus on the enforceability of post-employment covenants not to compete also
responds to the concerns of the new economic geography.  First, it ties the legal
infrastructure directly to the mechanism that gives knowledge its characteristic of
increasing returns within an industrial district.  Knowledge, especially tacit knowledge,
“spills over” between firms through the movement of employees between employers and
to start-ups.
Second, this aspect of the legal infrastructure dramatically illustrates the
importance of initial conditions.  The different legal rules governing post-employment
covenants not to compete in California and Massachusetts help explain the differences in
employee job mobility and therefore the knowledge transfer that Saxenian identifies as a
critical factor in explaining the differential performance of Silicon Valley and Route 128.
However, the difference in legal infrastructure does not result from the California
legislature’s efforts to provide the proper conditions for the development of high
technology industrial districts.  Rather, the California prohibition dates to the 1870s, a
serendipitous result of the historical coincidence between the codification movement in
6
the United States and the problems confronting a new state in developing a coherent legal
system out of its conflicting inheritance of Spanish, Mexican, and English law.  The
existence of this anachronistic legal rule at the time that Silicon Valley developed solved
the collective action problem associated with encouraging employee mobility within the
district.
Part I briefly develops the concept of agglomeration economies that give rise to
industrial districts, and then sketches the emphasis of the new economic geography on
knowledge spillovers and path dependency.  Part II summarizes Saxenian’s account of
the comparative experiences of Silicon Valley and Route 128, which tracks the new
economic geography in focusing on knowledge spillovers as giving rise to an
agglomeration economy, and on employee mobility as the mechanism by which inter-
firm knowledge transfers occur in Silicon Valley.  Part III then offers an alternative
explanation of the differences in employee mobility that Saxenian persuasively argues is
at the center of the two district’s differential performance.  Saxenian emphasizes culture –
laid back California versus button-down New England.  In contrast, I stress differences in
the two districts’ legal infrastructures as an antecedent to business culture: the differential
enforceability of covenants not to compete.  Part III also demonstrates how the California
legal infrastructure solves the collective action problem associated with encouraging
knowledge spillover through employee mobility.  Part IV then completes development of
the initial conditions that ultimately supported the continued success of Silicon Valley by
tracing the origins of this critical aspect of Silicon Valley’s legal infrastructure to the
peculiar circumstances immediately following California’s statehood.  Part V concludes
by offering a cautionary note with respect to the implications of my analysis for three
7
related subjects: the standard law and economics prescription to fully protect property
rights in intellectual property; a disturbing recent line of cases concerning claims of
“inevitable disclosure” that threatens to turn trade secret law into the equivalent of a
judicially imposed covenant not to compete; and the right strategy for policy analysts
assessing reform of a region’s legal infrastructure to encourage new, or preserve a
region’s existing, high technology industrial districts.
I. Economic Geography: Agglomeration Economies, High Technology, and
Industrial Districts
Economic geography seeks to explain “the location of factors of production in
space.”9  For our purposes, the object of the investigation is the presence of industrial
districts: why firms in an industry locate in geographic proximity to each other.  The
policy motivation for the concern is readily apparent.  If we can understand the
conditions that give rise to high technology industrial districts, then we can provide
regions seeking to preserve or increase the number and quality of available jobs a
blueprint for what steps to take.
The inquiry took modern form with Alfred Marshall’s focus in 1890 on the
potential for economies of scale external to the firm.10  The familiar concept of
economies of scale internal to the firm contemplates that production costs will fall as
firm output increases.  Marshall, in contrast, was concerned with the effects of an
increase in scale at the regional level. Firms would cluster in an industrial district if
increased regional output – the scale of production outside the firm – caused input costs
to decline.  Marshall offered the cost of skilled labor as an example.  As the number of
employers of skilled workers within a region increases, workers with those skills are
                                               
9 Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1991).
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drawn to the region.  As the number of skilled workers within a region increases,
employers in need of workers with those skills are drawn to the region.11  The result,
styled by Marshall an agglomeration economy and in later literature a Marshallian factor
market externality,12 reflects generally the propensity for an input’s relative price to be
lower when the number of firms in a region that call for that input is higher.13
At this point, it is important to keep in mind the limited power of agglomeration
economies in explaining the existence of industrial districts.  An industrial district has
two geographic characteristics, one relative and one absolute.  The relative characteristic
is the geographic relation of firms to each other – their proximity in space.  An industrial
district represents a spatial clustering of firms somewhere.  The absolute characteristic is
the actual location of the industrial district: its physical location in space, in districts of
concern to Marshall, their particular location in Sheffield or Lancashire.  Agglomeration
economies explain the relative characteristic of an industrial district – why firms are close
together.  The concept does not explain where in physical space the clustering occurs.
                                                                                                                                           
10 A. MARSHALL, supra note 3, at 266-77.
11 When an industry has chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long:
so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get
from near neighborhood to one another. . . .  Employers are apt to resort to any
place where they are likely to find a good choice of workers . . .; while men seeking
employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need
skills such as theirs . . . .
MARSHALL, supra note 3 at 271-72.
12 See, e.g., Paul A. David, Domenique Foray & Jean-Michelle Dalle, Marshallian Externalities and the
Emergence and Spatial Stability of Technological Enclaves, working paper (July 1996).  The same
phenomenon should occur with other mobile factors of production that have industry specific value.
13 The analysis necessarily assumes that transportation costs for the input are positive.  While the discussion
in the text suggests that the input price decline results from a supply effect, input price is also affected by
the risk sharing that can occur from the clustering of employers.  Assume that having to move one’s
residence to secure another job is costly to an employee.  If the risk of unemployment because of the failure
of a particular employer is not perfectly correlated with the demand for workers at other firms in the region,
then the clustering of firms reduces the expected cost of unemployment to the employee.  That, in turn,
reduces the portion of the wage paid to compensate for unemployment risk.  David & Rosenbloom, supra
note 5, at 351-53.
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Spurred by the interest in high technology industrial districts, the new economic
geography continued Marshall’s emphasis on increasing returns, but with two important
shifts in emphasis.  First, reflecting the interest in high technology industrial districts,
attention focused on knowledge as a critical input subject to agglomeration economies.14
Second, reflecting the policy motivation for the inquiry, more attention was paid to
understanding those elements of the phenomenon that traditional agglomeration
economies may not explain: the dynamics of industrial districts – how they start, where
they start, and once started, their pattern of development.
That knowledge as an input is subject to increasing returns as a result of
geographic proximity initially presents something of a puzzle.  Precisely because of high
technology, information has lost its geographic anchor.  For example, the physical
location of a law library is unimportant when the case reports are available electronically
through Lexis or Westlaw.  Nor does physical location seem to matter very much when
new scientific discoveries are immediately announced over the Internet.  The reality of
instantaneous communication through the World Wide Web has linked the world
scientific community through electronic rather than physical proximity.  From this
perspective, the effect of technology should be to eliminate knowledge based
agglomeration economies; the more important knowledge is as an input, the less likely
we should be to observe industrial clustering.
 The puzzle disappears when one distinguishes between information on the one
hand, and knowledge or know-how on the other.  For this purpose, the distinction is in
the tacit character of knowledge, not the formal conception of an innovation, but the skill
                                               
14 Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCAND. J. ECON. 29 (supplement, 1992), reviews the
literature in the area.
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and experience associated with effectively implementing it.15  Although advances in
information technology may have caused the cost of transmitting the formal conception
to become invariant to distance, effectively transmitting tacit knowledge requires
proximity, and hence creates the potential for agglomeration economies.16  The need for
proximity for knowledge transmission creates the potential for two kinds of
agglomeration economies.  Where tacit knowledge is acquired through a market
relationship, as through the transmission of technological know-how by contact with a
supplier, the potential for a Marshallian factor market externality exists.  In contrast,
where tacit knowledge is transferred informally, the potential for technological
externalities is created.  In particular, the movement of workers between employers
serves also to transfer tacit knowledge between firms.
Attention to the origins of agglomeration economies gives rise to the second
characteristic of the new economic geography.  The feedback process inherent in a
Marshallian factor market externality – more firms [skilled workers] in a region leads to a
migration of skilled workers [firms] to the region, which leads to a migration of more
firms [skilled workers] – must start somewhere.  However, nothing in the analysis thus
far explains how or where the loop starts.  Efforts to model the process suggest that the
dynamics of district development are very sensitive to initial conditions; that is, the
                                               
15 See Maryann P. Feldman, The Geography of Innovation 14, 52 (1994); David B. Audretsch & Maryann
P. Feldman, R&D Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and Production, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 530
(1996); David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Innovative Clusters and the Industry Life Cycle, 11
REV. INDUS. ORG. 253, 256) 1996).  Feldman, supra, states the distinction nicely: “some aspects of
knowledge have a tacit nature that cannot be completely codified and transferred through blueprints and
instructions.”  Id. at 52.
16 MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 49-65 (1958)
(describing one’s skills as “the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person
following them.”); id. at 69-77 (describing the processes of learning); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G.
WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 76-82, 115-16 (1982) (describing the tacit
nature of skills.
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course of subsequent growth may depend importantly on small differences between
regions at the outset.  As Brian Arthur has put it, an industrial district may develop “not
necessarily because of any advantage of that particular location, but because ‘historical
accident’ placed certain firms there initially and this concentration of firms in turn
attracted [through the lure of agglomeration economies] a high proportion of subsequent
entrants.”17
The combination of (i) knowledge as an input giving rise to a Marshallian factor
market externality, (ii) technological agglomeration economies,  and (iii) the dependence
on history of the actual location of an industrial district, brings us to a final element of the
economic structure of industrial districts: the life cycle of an industrial district.  There is
persuasive empirical evidence that the location of high technology industrial districts is
associated with major university complexes.18  To be sure, that association is insufficient
to explain why Stanford gave rise to Silicon Valley and Harvard and MIT gave rise to
Route 128, while similar phenomena were not associated with other major universities in
the United States or elsewhere (an issue to which we will turn in Part II).  However, my
concern here is not with the formation of a high technology industrial district, but with its
subsequent development.
                                               
 18 W. Brian Arthur, ‘Silicon Valley’ Locational Clusters: When Do Increasing Returns Imply Monopoly?,
19 MATH. SOC. SCI. 235 (1990).  See Krugman, supra note 9, at 487 (“[S]mall changes in the parameters of
the economy may have large effects on its qualitative behavior. . . .  The story also suggests that the details
of the geography that emerges – which region ends up with the population – depends sensitively on initial
conditions.”); David & Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 368 (‘[T]he sensitivity of the ultimate dynamic
outcomes to small differences in initial conditions, or to relatively small shocks, allows realistic scope for
historical events to play a role in the dynamics of spatial systems [which] allows the details of seemingly
transient and adventitious circumstances to exert an enduring influence upon the spatial distribution of
economic activity and population.”)
18 See, e.g., Audretsch & Feldman, R& D Spillovers, supra note 15; Audretsch & Feldman, Innovative
Clusters, supra note 15; Lynne G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby & Marilynn B. Brewer, Intellectual Capital
and the Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprise, NBER Working Paper #4653 (Feb. 1994).
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Controlling for initial conditions, a combination of Marshallian factor market
externalities and technological agglomeration economies can explain the initial
development of a high technology industrial district.  A scientific innovation, likely
linked to university-originated research and development, has the potential for
commercialization.  A university community, in turn, provides an initial population of
scientifically trained workers to begin the commercialization process, thereby triggering
the skilled worker/ employer locational dynamic that creates an employee-related
Marshallian factor market externality.  At the same time, a technological agglomeration
economy in the form of knowledge spillover from universities creates the opportunities
for the new firm formations that demand skilled workers.19  But what influences the
subsequent pattern of the district’s development?
From this perspective, knowledge spillovers play a critical role.  Start first with an
industrial district based on a particular set of products.  Because tacit knowledge plays a
critical role in taking an innovation from conception to commercialization, the
agglomeration economy at the development/commercialization stage is likely to be large,
supporting significant geographical clustering.20  By contrast, tacit knowledge can be
expected to play a lesser role during later stages in the industry’s life cycle.  “In the
                                               
19 For example, Zucker, Darby & Brewer provide empirical evidence that  “the timing, and location of new
biotech firms and new biotech units of existing firms are primarily explained  by the presence at a
particular time and place of scientists who are actively contributing to the basic science as represented by
publications in major academic journals.”  Zucker, Darby & Brewer, supra note 18.  See also Neil Bania,
Randall W. Eberts, and Michael S. Fogarty, Universities and the Startup of New Companies: Can We
Generalize From Route 128 and Silicon Valley?, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 761 (1993) (reporting positive
relationship between local university research and firm births in the electrical and electronic equipment
industries).; Feldman, supra note 15, at 89 (noting the importance of university research and development
to measures of regional innovation).
20 “[T]he propensity for innovative activity to geographically cluster will tend to be shaped by the stage of
the industry life cycle. . . . [T]he importance of tacit knowledge in generating innovative activity shapes the
degree to which innovative activity will cluster.  And the relative importance of tacit knowledge in
generating innovative activity varies considerably across the various stages of an industry’s life cycle.”
Audretsch & Feldman, Innovative Clusters, supra note 15, at 254.
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mature stage [of the industry life cycle] most of the technical aspects of the product have
become standardized, and the nature of demand is well known.  At this point, the cost of
transmitting information over geographic space becomes trivial.”21  The industry’s focus
becomes standardized production rather than innovation.  Standardization, in turn,
combines with the reduced influence of agglomeration economies of knowledge and the
centrifugal force of congestion – the lower wage and land costs available outside the area
because of the impact of clustering on the costs of fixed inputs – to cause the geographic
dispersion of production.  Commentators, for example, have described the dispersion of
commodity-like semiconductor manufacturing from Silicon Valley to off shore sites as
having followed this pattern.22
The story thus depicts a cyclical model of the development of a high technology
industrial district.  University related scientific discovery gives rise to the tacit knowledge
that creates cluster inducing Marshallian and technological agglomeration economies,
and initial conditions fix the cluster’s physical location.  With the product’s maturity, the
knowledge-based agglomeration economies dissipate, the value of physical proximity
diminishes, and the industrial district diffuses.  The question then is whether anything can
interrupt this cycle of density giving way to dispersal.
At this point, the analysis shifts to the impact of knowledge spillovers not on the
commercialization of a given product, but on the district’s capacity for continued
innovation – the development of new products that will reset the industry life cycle.  Here
the literature stresses the importance of inter-firm knowledge spillovers.  Suppose
research and development in an industrial district takes place within a large number of
                                               
21 Id. at 259.  See Robin Coran & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of
Knowledge, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 595 (1997) (discussing process of codification of tacit knowledge).
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firms, the results of which are then shared among firms through both voluntary and
involuntary knowledge spillovers.  Voluntary spillovers occur through such mechanisms
as joint ventures, and cooperative supply relationships in which the exchange of
technology necessary to best serve the customer requires the customer to share its
technology with the supplier and vice versa.  The benefit of that knowledge spillover then
also accrues to the suppliers’ other customers.  Involuntary spillovers occur through the
movement of workers to new employers.  Tacit information associated with an
employer’s technology is embedded in the human capital of its employees.  When an
employee changes jobs, that tacit information is available to the new employer.  As one
of the founders of Intel remarked about information sharing in Silicon Valley: “The other
type of cooperation we might call involuntary.  That is the mobility of our personnel
which quickly diffuses knowledge of new techniques in design, production, and
marketing throughout the industry . . . .”23  These knowledge spillovers supercharge the
innovative capacity of the district, facilitating the development of new technologies that
create a new industrial life cycle, with renewed agglomeration economies.
Economic geography thus tells a coherent story about the pattern of industrial
districts.  Agglomeration economies – Marshallian and technological – fuel the growth of
a district whose physical location is dictated by initial conditions.  The spatial attraction
among firms is intense in the early stages of an industry’s life cycle when knowledge
spillovers are critical, only to dissipate as successful commercialization shifts emphasis to
production from innovation.  But knowledge spillovers between firms through voluntary
cooperation and involuntary employee movement also have the potential to sustain the
                                                                                                                                           
22 See SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 93-95.
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district’s centripetal force by repeatedly restarting the industrial life cycle through new
innovation – a form of “second-stage” agglomeration economy.  And at this point our
discussion of the two features of the new economic geography comes full circle: the
importance of initial conditions as a determinant of the particular location of an industrial
district reemerges.  Just as initial conditions determine where among a range of
alternative locations an industrial district actually arises, so too do they influence which
among competing industrial districts will develop a second stage agglomeration economy
and thereby reset its innovation cycle and overcome the locational entropy of product
cycle maturity.  As we will see, the institutional capacity of a high technology industrial
district to support knowledge spillover at this critical second stage, exemplified by the
differential experiences of Silicon Valley and Route 128, also appears to depend
importantly on historical accident.  In the case of Silicon Valley and Route 128, I will
argue, the historical accident is the different character of the two districts’ legal
infrastructure.
II. Silicon Valley versus Route 128: Organizational and Performance
Differences
In this Part we set up a natural experiment concerning the importance of the legal
infrastructure to the development of high technology industrial districts.  The
phenomenon that requires explanation is the differential performance of Silicon Valley
and Route 128.  Route 128 began the race well ahead.  In 1965, total technology
employment in the Route 128 area was roughly triple that of Silicon Valley.  By 1975,
Silicon Valley employment had increased five fold, but it had not quite doubled in Route
128, putting Silicon Valley about fifteen percent ahead in total technology employment.
                                                                                                                                           
23 Robert Noyce, Competition and Cooperation: A Prescription for the 80s, 25 RESEARCH MNGMNT. 13, 14
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Between 1975 and 1990, the gap substantially widened.  Over this period, Silicon Valley
created three times the number of new technology-related jobs as Route 128.24  By 1990,
Silicon Valley exported twice the amount of electronic products than Route 128,25 and
this comparison excludes fields like software and multimedia, in which Silicon Valley
growth has been strongest.  In 1995, Silicon Valley reported the highest gains in export
sales of any metropolitan area in the United States, an increase of 35 percent over 1994.
The Boston area, which includes Route 128, was not in the top five.26  What explains the
improvement in Silicon Valley’s performance, and the deterioration of that of Route 128?
Saxenian’s provides a careful account of the causes of the performance
differential that reflects the lessons of the new economic geography.  Different initial
conditions, reflecting the two areas different histories, account for the agglomeration and
technological economies that gave rise in the first instance to the two high technology
industrial districts.  However, differing patterns of industrial organization resulted in
differing levels of inter-firm knowledge spillovers and, in turn, differing capacities to
create the second stage agglomeration economy that can reset the district’s product life
cycle.  In this Part, we trace Saxenian’s perceptive analysis of the different industrial
                                                                                                                                           
(March 1982).
24 SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 2-3 (Figure 1).  The same pattern appears if only semiconductor jobs are
considered.  In 1959, Route 128 semiconductor companies employed approximately 27,500 workers, while
Silicon Valley companies employed only 10,000.  By 1970, the balance had reversed, Silicon Valley
semiconductor companies employing 32,500 workers, while Route 128 employment had shrunk to 19,000.
By 1980, the difference was even more pronounced, with Silicon Valley employment rising to 64,000,
while Route 128 employment remained flat at 19,000.  Id. at 79 (Figure 2).
25 Id. at 2.
26 In 1996, San Jose exported $29.3 billion, New York exported $28 billion, and Detriot exported $27.5
billion. The Boston area came in eleventh with $8.7 billion of exports.  See International Trade
Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Top Metro Area Exporters, 1996 (visited July 10, 1998)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/metro/top2596.html>. Measuring success along a different
dimension, it has been reported that the market capitalization of technology companies in and around
Silicon Valley approximately equals that of the entire French Stock Market.  Silicon Valley:  Introduction,
BUS. WK, Aug. 25, 1997.  In 1996, Silicon Valley’s unemployment was 3.1% and its exports were rising at
about 30% per year.  Louise Kehoc, The Valley’s Magic Formula, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at 13.
17
organization of Silicon Valley and Route 128 and how that difference influenced the
existence of knowledge spillovers.  In the next Part, we take up the issue that Saxenian’s
account does not explain: why Silicon Valley developed the knowledge based second
stage agglomeration economy that allowed the district to transcend its original product
life cycle.  Put differently, what initial conditions caused the second round agglomeration
economy to develop in Silicon Valley and not in Route 128?
A. District Origins
Both Route 128 and Silicon Valley had their origins in local universities.  But
while the Harvard/MIT complex for Route 128, and Stanford University for Silicon
Valley, provided the core around which each district grew, different events triggered the
emergence of the industrial districts in these particular localities around these particular
universities.
For Route 128, the critical event was the increase in defense spending on
technology during World War II and the Cold War.  MIT received more military funding
during the World War II than any other university, in no small measure due to the
presence of an MIT professor, Vannevar Bush, as head of the government funding
agency.27  This funding led to MIT’s creation of the Radiation Laboratory.  Similarly, Air
Force funding during the early Cold War period led to the formation of Lincoln Lab at
MIT in 1951.  By the mid-1960s, Boston area university-related research labs employed
some 5,000 scientists and engineers.28  Consistent with the existence of agglomeration
economies resulting from the concentration of skilled engineers, the area proved a fertile
ground for commercial technology development.  Lincoln Lab scientists founded more
                                               
27 SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 13.
28 Id. at 16.
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than fifty companies, including DEC, and another fifty-five were founded by scientists
from the MIT Instrumentation Lab.29
Like Route 128, Silicon Valley’s modern form also took shape after World War
II.30  While Hewlett-Packard and Litton Engineering Laboratories had been formed in the
1930s, the initial conditions associated with Silicon Valley’s emergence are found in the
efforts of Frederick Terman, an MIT Ph.D. who became Stanford’s dean of engineering
following World War II.  Having been both a student of Vannevar Bush at MIT and
director of Harvard’s Radio Research Lab during World War II, Terman saw first hand
the potential benefits from university/industry collaboration.  He returned to Stanford
after World War II and pioneered Stanford’s efforts to develop the agglomeration
economies necessary to establishing a high technology industrial district.  He increased
the size of the Stanford engineering program so that by 1950 its award of doctoral
degrees in electrical engineering equaled that of MIT.  This was followed during the
1950s by efforts to expand the range of university-industry knowledge spillovers.
Stanford founded the Stanford Research Institute explicitly as a bridge between
university research and commercial application. Stanford also initiated its Honors
Cooperative Program, which encouraged engineers at local companies to enroll in
graduate programs at the university, thereby formalizing university-company interaction.
Finally, Stanford turned some of its own land adjacent to the campus into the Stanford
Industrial Park, which assured that physical proximity would reinforce ties between the
university and the electronics community.  By 1961, the industrial park housed 25
companies over 652 acres.
                                               
29 SUSAN ROSENGRANT & DAVID LAMPE, ROUTE 128: LESSONS FROM BOSTON’S HIGH-TECH COMMUNITY
93, 99 (1992)
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Thus, Marshallian factor market externalities and  technological economies
combined to support the growth of Route 128 and Silicon Valley as high technology
industrial districts.  The initial conditions that favored those universities and localities
were different, World War II Federal research funds providing the trigger for
Harvard/MIT and Route 128, and the efforts of Frederick Terman, in part shaped by his
own experience in Boston, acting as the spur to Stanford and Silicon Valley.
B. Subsequent Development
Saxenian’s account of the differential performance of Silicon Valley and 128
centers on the strikingly different forms of industrial organization that came to
characterize the two regions.  From the outset, Silicon Valley developed a business
structure that reflected non-linear career patterns and a special status for entrepreneurs.
The career paths of Silicon Valley engineers and managers resembled Brownian motion.
They moved between companies, founded start-ups, supplied former employers,
purchased from former employees, and in the course of a career developed personal and
professional relationships that cut across companies and competition.  During the 1970s,
employee turnover averaged 35 percent a year at the region’s electronics firms;31 even in
the severe recession in the semiconductor industry in 1984, 12 percent of a sample of
Silicon Valley electronics production engineers quit their existing jobs for different
employers.32  As Saxenian characterized the environment in Silicon Valley, “engineers
                                                                                                                                           
30 This account draws on SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 21-24.
31 Id. at 34.
32 David Angel, The Labor Market for Engineers in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 65 ECON. GEOG. 99,
103 (1989) (“These results indicate substantial labor mobility among semiconductor performance engineers
and confirm the expectation of frequent job changes by these highly skilled workers.”)
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shifted between firms so frequently that mobility not only was socially acceptable, it
became the norm.”33
Entrepreneurs occupy a special place in the Silicon Valley hierarchy.34  As Joseph
Bankman and I have written elsewhere, “in Silicon Valley the defining myth takes as its
stage David Packard’s or Steve Job’s garage.  Palo Alto’s Roland is the engineer who,
with nothing but an idea and strength of character, leaves his job with an established
company and starts a firm that becomes an industry leader, in the process becoming
fabulously wealthy.”35  Literally scores of companies, including most prominently Intel,
trace their origins to a founder’s prior employment at Fairchild Semiconductor, which
itself had been formed by engineers leaving Shockley Transistor Corporation.  As
Saxenian notes, Hewlitt-Packard executives alone founded eighteen start-ups between
1974 and 1984.36
The result of what Alan Hyde calls “high velocity employment”37 – rapid
employee movement both between employers and in connection with founding start-ups
– is a pattern of industrial organization in which firms are remarkably porous to outside
influence.  Firms have not vertically integrated, because smaller start-ups could provide
parts cheaper and more effectively.  In turn, the availability of a full range of suppliers
                                               
33 SAXENIAN. supra note 8, at 34.  As one engineer told Saxenian; “Two or three years is about max (at a
job) for the Valley because there is always something more interesting across the street.  You don’t see
someone staying twenty years at a job here.”  Id. at 35.  The comments of another engineer captures the
absence of friction in moving between jobs associated with a Marshallian factor market externality: “[in
Silicon Valley] it wasn’t that big a catastrophe to quit your job on Friday and have another on Monday and
this was just as true for company executives.  You  didn’t necessarily even have to tell your wife.  You just
drive off in another direction on Monday morning.  You didn’t have to sell your house, and your kids didn’t
have to change schools.”  Id.
34 Saxenian reports that “[t]he culture of the Valley accorded the highest regard to those that started
firms. . . .”  Id. at 38.
35 Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups? 1 (forthcoming, STAN.L.REV. 1999).
36 SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 116.  Silicon Valley’s fascination with start-ups also has efficiency
advantages.  A large literature suggests that the small companies are more likely sources of innovation.  See
Bankman & Gilson, supra note 35 (surveying the literature).
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reduced the capital necessary to found a start-up; virtually everything but the idea could
be subcontracted out.38  Moreover, vertical integration could not even effectively protect
a company’s trade secrets; too many employees would move to competitors carrying their
employer’s know how with them (who in turn would benefit from an inflow of
employees from other employers).
Thus, Silicon Valley’s form of industrial organization institutionalized the
knowledge spillovers that constitute the second stage agglomeration economy critical to
an industrial district’s resetting its production lifecycle.  With this local industry
structure, a single company need not be a technological leader in every stage of a
product’s manufacturing process.  Instead it can specialize in one stage, whether research
and design or fabrication, and rely on suppliers or customers to provide cutting edge
technology at other stages.  In Saxenian’s account, knowledge spillovers facilitated by the
mobility of employees and the resulting bias against vertical integration, turns the entire
industrial district into an engine of continuous innovation, thereby transcending the
lifecycle of any single product.
Route 128 firms, in contrast, developed in more traditional fashion, imitating the
vertically integrated structures of the large mass production company.39  In contrast to the
Brownian motion of Silicon Valley’s high velocity employment, career patterns of
employers and managers in Route 128 companies were much more linear.  Knowledge
workers anticipated long-term employment with a single employer, and career
development that contemplated rising vertically within an organization, rather than
succeeding through lateral movement, as in Silicon Valley.  As Saxenian emphasizes,
                                                                                                                                           
37 Hyde, supra note 7.
38 SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 38-40, 72-73.
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“[t]he practice of leaving a large company to join a small firm or a promising start up was
virtually unheard of.”40  Consistent with this pattern, Route 128 gave rise to traditionally
vertically integrated companies; in this locality, knowledge transfer took place within,
rather than across firms.41  As a result, learning and innovation were company specific
exercises.  Missing was the knowledge spillover and the corresponding second stage
agglomeration economy that resulted from the distribution of innovation across the
district associated with employee mobility and the absence of vertical integration.  To be
sure, particular companies in Route 128 created innovative products, but the performance
of the district as a whole deteriorated.  The district was unable to consistently reset the
product life cycle, with a resulting secular decline across the region.
C. Explanations for the Organizational and Performance Differentials
Saxenian’s account provides three-quarters of the elements necessary to explain
the origins and different trajectories of the Silicon Valley and Route 128 high technology
districts.  Consistent with the new economic geography, a complete story must account
for four elements: (i) the initial conditions and (ii) associated agglomeration economies
that explain both the location and original success of the two districts, and (iii) the initial
conditions and (iv) associated second-stage agglomeration economy whose presence has
allowed Silicon Valley to reset its product life cycle and whose absence has contributed
to Route 128’s decline.  The story so far explains the initial conditions and agglomeration
economies that gave rise to Silicon Valley and Route 128, and the agglomeration
                                                                                                                                           
39 Id. at 70.
40 Id. at 63.  The differential in the founding of start-ups is startling.  According to Saxenian, the largest
wave of start-ups in Silicon Valley history began in the late 1970s and continued during the 1980s.  Id. at
117.  During the same period, the rate of start-ups in Route 128 declined.  Id. at 125.  For example, in 1981
venture capitalists funded only 17 start-ups in Massachusetts, while funding 37 in Silicon Valley.  Id. at 64.
41 Id. at 69-70.
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economy present in Silicon Valley and absent in Route 128 that allowed Silicon Valley to
continually recreate the district.  What is missing is item (iv): an account of the initial
conditions whose presence facilitated the second stage agglomeration economy in Silicon
Valley and whose absence prevented its development in Route 128.
Saxenian’s tale of two districts does reveal the basic mechanism whose
differential availability must be explained. The second stage agglomeration economy
results from inter-company, intra-district knowledge spillovers that cause the entire
district to function as an innovation laboratory.  These spillovers result from the pattern
of extreme employee mobility characteristic of Silicon Valley and absent in Route 128.
The web of knowledge spillovers, personal relations, start-up businesses, and absence of
vertical integration all owe their existence to the ease with which employees move from
employer to employer, from established company to start-up, taking their employer’s
tacit knowledge with them, and applying it in their new situation.  Lacking the ability to
prevent knowledge spillovers, Silicon Valley companies adapted to their environment,
and the characteristic Silicon Valley industrial organization evolved.42
But that leaves us with the missing item: why did high velocity employment
evolve in Silicon Valley and not in Route 128?  What were the initial conditions
associated with the second round agglomeration economy?
                                               
42 The story is one in which initial conditions lead to the adoption of complementary institutions – those
that make existing institutions more productive.  Development of the system thus moves in a domino like
fashion as existing institutions give rise to associated institutions that provide this fit.  See Paul Migrom &
John Roberts, Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Organizational Change, 19 J. ACCTNG.
& ECON. 179 (1995); Paul Migrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and Systems: Understanding
Japanese Economic Organization, 9 ESTUDIOS ECONOMICOS 3 (1994); Paul Migrom & John Roberts, The
Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 511
(1990).
24
Saxenian offers a partial but, in the end, unsatisfying answer: culture or “social
structure.”43  In Silicon Valley the absence of a prior culture allowed the development of
a new one – one which reinforced open social and professional relations.  These open
relations also “functioned as efficient job search networks,”44 critically important in a
culture in which “the preferred career option . . . was to join a small company or a start-
up, rather than an established company.  The superiority of small, innovation firms over
large corporations became an article of faith among many of the region’s engineers.”45
The culture in Route 128 differed.  “The conservative social traditions and attitudes of
New England also shaped the organization of local labor markets and patterns of
entrepreneurship.  Stability and company loyalty were valued over experimentation and
risk taking in the Route 128 region.”46  Thus, in Saxenian’s account, cultural differences
in the two regions provide the crucial initial conditions that led to different employment
patterns and, ultimately, to different patterns of industrial organization only one of which
– Silicon Valley’s – would give rise to a second stage agglomeration economy.
But why did Silicon Valley culture develop differently from Route 128?
Accepting Saxenian’s description of the two districts, her proffer of culture as the
causative agent of the critical differences in employee career patterns is ultimately
unpersuasive.  Standing alone, cultural explanations are incomplete accounts of the
characteristics of economic institutions.  It is hardly surprising that culture and
economically successful institutions are mutually supportive; the intriguing result would
be if the two conflicted.  But the correspondence between culture and economics leaves
                                               
43 Id. at 29.
44 Id. at 34.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 62.
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open the question of causation,47 a matter of great importance if part of the goal is to
understand the structure necessary to support a high technology district.
The new economic geography and Saxenian’s deep description of the Silicon
Valley and Route 128 thus combine to leave us with a critical question:  What initial
conditions gave rise to the regions’ centrally different employment patterns?  As Paul
Krugman put it, “given a slightly different sequence of events, Silicon Valley might have
been in Los Angeles, Massachusetts, or even Oxfordshire.”48  And that brings us to the
influence of the legal infrastructure.
II. The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts
In Part II’s account of the second stage agglomeration economy whose presence
explains Silicon Valley’s capacity to reset the district’s product cycle, employee mobility
plays the central role.  Much of a high technology firm’s intellectual property is informal
in character.  As Robert Merges has explained, “[a] great deal of the relevant information
is in the form of trade secrets or ‘tacit’ knowledge and know-how. . . .  Accounts of
industrial R&D and invention almost universally mention the importance of hands-on
experience, much of it gained over time and in the course of interactions with other
researchers, manufacturing personnel, and marketing experts in the firm.”49  This element
of the employer’s intellectual property is imbedded in the employee’s human capital, and
can be most effectively transferred through proximity and, in particular, by an employee
changing jobs.  Thus, employee mobility is the mechanism by which the requisite
knowledge spillover occurs.  But an individual employer has an obvious competitive
                                               
47 See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese
Corporate Governance, working paper (Sept. 1997).
48 Paul Krugman, Complex Landscapes in Economic Geography,  84 AM. ECON. REV. 412, 415 (1994).
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interest in protecting its intellectual capital which, in the case of trade secrets and tacit
knowledge, is accomplished by restricting employee mobility.  Individually rational
employer efforts to protect intellectual property ultimately conflict with the collectively
rational conditions necessary to the knowledge spillovers that support the critical second
stage agglomeration economy.
The legal infrastructure of a high technology industrial district mediates this
tension between intellectual property protection on the one hand, and employee mobility
on the other.  In this Part, our concern will be with the complementary legal rules that
both determine the character of intellectual property rights, and shape the terms of the
employment relation.  Demonstrating the differences between the California and
Massachusetts rules in these two critical respects is the first step in identifying
differences in the two districts’ legal infrastructure as an important initial condition that
ultimately helped shape their different experiences.
I should take up at the outset a straightforward response to the importance this
account accords the aspects of the legal infrastructure bearing on employee mobility.  If
encouraging inter-employer spillovers of trade secrets and tacit knowledge through
employee mobility results in a second-stage agglomeration economy, and if the average
per firm value of that economy exceeds the corresponding average per firm cost of
weakened intellectual property protection, then the legal infrastructure will be irrelevant.
Individual firms acting in their own self interest will elect not to interfere with employee
mobility, resulting in a self-enforcing equilibrium of high velocity employment.50
                                                                                                                                           
49 Robert Merges, Property Rights Theory and Employee Inventions in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY
61, 79 (Conf. Vol., The Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, May 1998).
50 I have in mind here Robert Ellickson’s study of the difference between the rules actually applied by the
community and the law on the books, in resolving cattle disputes in Shasta County.  Residents developed
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The difficulty with this account of self-organization is the familiar coordination
barrier to collective action.  While it would be in the interest of the region’s firms
collectively to facilitate employee mobility even at the expense of diluting the intellectual
property of individual firms, it will be in the interest of any individual firm to impede the
mobility of its own employees.  Such a firm gets the benefit of the region wide spillover
of other firms’ intellectual property without incurring the cost of diluting its own.  Some
coordinating mechanism is necessary to achieve (and perhaps maintain) the equilibrium,
which brings us back to the role of the legal infrastructure.51  Whether because Silicon
Valley firms did not realize the regional advantages from employee mobility, or because
of the difficulty of coordination, local firms’ initial response to employee mobility
reflected an individually rational strategy.  As Saxenian describes, early in the district’s
development employers responded to departing employees by taking legal action.  Even
in her account, it was only the failure of these efforts that led to employer acceptance of
high velocity employment.52
                                                                                                                                           
and applied their own rules independent of the formal legal infrastructure.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
51 Gilson & Roe, supra note 47, consider a similar claim with respect to the absence of an external labor
market associated with Japanese lifetime employment.  That analysis suggests, consistent with the text, that
individual firm self-interest will prevent the evolution of a self-enforcing equilibrium.  They conclude that
establishing the equilibrium observed over most of the post-World War II period in Japan required
government coordination.
52 SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 35. Indeed, occasional outbursts of employer hostility to employee mobility
continue to occur.  According to accounts in advertisements taken out by Oracle Corporation in the San
Francisco Chronicle and on billboards along U.S. 101 (which runs by Oracle headquarters), eleven
computer programmers at Informix, an Oracle competitor, left Informix and joined Oracle in January,
1997.  According to the Oracle advertisement, the day the employees quit, the CEO of Informix confronted
the CEO of Oracle at his home, asking Oracle “to return the eleven ‘runaway’ employees.”  The next day,
Informix sued each of the departing employees.  Oracle appeared to be taking some pleasure in the event,
the advertisement offering the following advice to various interested parties: “Advice to Informix: Hire
programmers, not lawyers. . . .  Advice to Informix programmers: Negotiate your legal fees upfront.
Advice to Informix customers: Call Oracle.”  Advertisement, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., March 9, 1997, p.
B-7, col. 3 (emphasis in the original).
28
Our inquiry thus starts with the ability of Silicon Valley firms to prevent
knowledge spillovers through employee mobility.  As we will see, the regime of high
velocity employment appears to have resulted from the legal infrastructure’s inspired
failure to provide complete protection for an important category of intellectual property.
The inability to prevent knowledge spillover through employee mobility then proved to
be one pole around which the character of Silicon Valley’s business culture and industrial
organization precipitated.
A. Protecting Tacit Knowledge and Inventions through Trade Secret and
Invention Law
1.  Tacit Knowledge. Trade secret law provides the most
straightforward source of protection for an employer’s tacit knowledge that has become
embedded in an employee’s human capital.  Stated generally, employees retain the right
to use their general and industry specific human capital when they move to a new
position.  However, they cannot make use of an employer’s trade secrets; conceptually, at
least, employers have the right to prevent employees from “spilling over” tacit
knowledge that constitutes a trade secret.  If the employer can prove that the new
employer of a former employee has used its trade secrets, a variety of remedies are
available, including injunctive relief and damages.  The problem, however, is that trade
secret law provides less effective protection than may at first appear.
The line between the employee’s general and industry specific knowledge on the
one hand, and the employer’s trade secrets on the other, is drawn by the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (“UTA”), which has been adopted in one form or another by 41 states
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(including California) and the District of Columbia.53  The UTA defines a trade secret as
“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure, and (ii) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain secrecy.”54
While Massachusetts has not adopted the UTA, its common law definition of a trade
secret is for practical purposes identical.55
The definition establishes the elements of the cause of action for misappropriation
of a trade secret – the mechanism by which an employer would protect its tacit
knowledge from spilling over to a competitor by means of an employee’s departure.  The
original employer would have to show that the former employee’s new employer
“misappropriated”56 information of the original employer, that the information was not
                                               
53 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39, at 437-38 (listing adopting states).  The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted by 41 states and the District of Columbia.  These states are
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Lousiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Okalahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
54 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (definitions) (amended 1985).  The California version appears as CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 1997).  The California statute differs from the UTA in that it omits the phrase
“and not being readily ascertainable by proper means.”  This omission has the effect of providing broader
protection than the UTA, a point we will consider TAN __ infra.
55 See, e.g., CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it,” quoting Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman
Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835, 838, 364 N.E. 2d 799, 801 (1977), quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §
757 cmt. b (1939).  The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 defines a trade secret as
“any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”  The reporters state
with respect to § 39 that “[t]he concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intented to be
consistent with the definition of “trade secret” in § 1(4) of the [UTA].”   
56 The UTA § 1 defines “misappropriation” as:
(1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the
trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
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generally known, and that the original employer had made reasonable efforts to protect
the information’s secrecy.  From the perspective of an original employer seeking to
protect competitively sensitive tacit knowledge, two problems are readily apparent.  The
first is substantive, the second procedural.
The substantive problem relates to the imprecision of the lines that the UTA
requires a litigant to establish.  The distinction between tacit knowledge imbedded in the
employee’s human capital that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known,” and an employee’s general or industry specific human
capital is blurred at very best.  Similarly uncertain are what efforts to maintain secrecy
are “reasonable under the circumstances,” and therefore required by the UTA as a
condition to trade secret protection.  Articles by California practitioners provide a lengthy
litany of protective activities that would help establish the requisite effort to maintain
secrecy, 57 but all are expensive and some are likely to interfere with the actual conduct of
the business.  This point is especially important.  When lawyers design procedures that
are inconvenient for those that actually must implement them, the procedures have a
                                                                                                                                           
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person
who
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of the disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of
the trade secret was
(i) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
(ii) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit
use; or
(iii) derived from or thorough a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) Before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade
secret, and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 1997).
57 See, e.g., VICTORIA CUNDIFF, Protecting Computer Software as a Trade Secret, in 18TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW (PLI, 1998); GARY WEISS, SEAN LINCOLN & ERIN FARRELL, Protecting
Trade Secrets:  A Primer for California Start-ups, in LEGAL DOCUMENTATION FOR START-UP AND
EMERGING COMPANIES (Education Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California,
1997); MARINA TSATALIS & TIMOTHY KLIMA, Protecting Trade Secrets from Malicious Employees, in
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tendency to be ignored.  From an evidentiary standpoint, adopting a procedure that is then
ignored is more damaging than never having adopted it in the first place.  The initial
adoption cuts off the argument that the procedure was unnecessary in the first place.
Finally, the matter remains a judgment call for the trier of fact.
The procedural problem derives from the substantive problem.  Precisely because
the distinctions the UTA requires a plaintiff to establish are imprecise, trade secret
litigation is likely to be expensive and slow.  The frequency with which phrases like
“knows [knew] or has [had] reason to know” or “reasonable under the circumstances”
appear in the statute is a fair metric for the breadth of discovery by the defendant.
Moreover, it is quite unlikely that such issues will be resolvable by summary judgment.
As Judge Posner said with respect to the original employer’s obligation to maintain
secrecy, “[b]ut only in an extreme case can what is a ‘reasonable’ precaution be
determined on a motion for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a
balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case and so require estimation
and measurement by persons knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor involved.
. . .  There are contested issues of fact here, bearing in mind that what is reasonable is
itself a fact for purposes of Rule 56 of the civil rules.”58  In every case, the plaintiff will
have to take seriously the threat that the matter will actually have to be tried, with the
resulting uncertainty associated with a jury trial of technical issues.
                                                                                                                                           
LEGAL DOCUMENTATION FOR START-UP AND EMERGING COMPANIES (Education Committee of the Business
Law Section of the State Bar of California, 1997).
58 Rockwell Graphics Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179-80  (7th Cir. 1991).  Note
also that Judge Posner’s reference to “estimations and measurements by persons knowledgeable in the
particular field” can be fairly read to invite a contest of expensive experts and a parallel round of expert
discovery.
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In short, litigation seeking to protect an employer’s trade secrets from spilling
over by a former employee’s taking with her the employer’s tacit knowledge has two
important characteristics that are amusingly (albeit distressingly) highlighted in tongue-
in-cheek quips that I have heard from commercial litigators.  The first has counsel for a
potential trade secret plaintiff advising her client that “no price is too high for justice.”  In
contrast, the second has counsel for the potential defendant advising her client that
“justice delayed is justice.”  On balance, trade secret law does not seem to provide a
significant barrier to high velocity employment and, at least in California, it apparently
has not.59
Care must be taken not to overstate the argument.  Trade secret law does have
some force.  Actions in response to theft and industrial espionage, because they are
unlikely to involve tacit knowledge, are not subject to the same level of ambiguity
associated with efforts to restrict employee mobility. And significant protection is
provided even against departing employees in circumstances where the misappropriation
is clear (as when the former employee has removed or copied documents), the technology
obviously secret, and the damage to the business substantial.  But it remains the case that
protection is limited with respect to the kind of knowledge spillovers that give rise to a
second stage agglomeration economy.  In this regard, one should keep in mind that the
practical considerations weighing against employee litigation will grow with the
                                               
59 A third concern involves the danger that the litigation process itself will result in the disclosure of the
trade secret to third parties whose subsequent use of the trade secret will not violate the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act because the third party will not have "misappropriated" the information.  In California, for
example, Code of Civil Procedure § 2019 requires that "the party alleging the misappropriation shall
identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity..."  Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 2019(d) (West, 1997).  To
be sure, in any action under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act the court is directed to "preserve the secrecy of
an alleged trade secret by reasonable means ... ."  Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.5 (West, 1997).  However, the
practical difficulty of adequately policing the large number of third parties who will come to know the trade
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development  of the industrial district, thus continually raising the value threshold that
must be crossed before it will be worthwhile to initiate trade secret litigation against a
former employee.  In my analysis, the absence of legal barriers to high velocity
employment provides the pole around which a complementary business culture
precipitates.  Once a business culture supportive of high velocity employment is
established, trade secret litigation against former employees is not only expensive and
uncertain, but also risks the imposition of labor market imposed reputation penalties
against the unusual employer who sues a departing employee.  Hyde provides examples
of this phenomenon; the recent Oracle-Informix controversy provides yet another.60
Thus, as the high technology industrial district takes form, the costs of a former employer
pursuing trade secret litigation against departing employees rise.   Given the initial
condition, local employment practices evolve toward a self-enforcing equilibrium
2.  Inventions. Legal rules appear to provide the employer
little more comfort when an employee leaves with a new invention to form a start-up,
than they do when an employee leaves with tacit knowledge to work for a competitor.
The standards governing who owns an invention discovered by an employee depends on
the stage of the inventive process at which the question is asked.  The critical point in the
process is “conception,” defined as “the first occurrence of the complete invention in the
mind of the inventor – as corroborated by objective evidence.”61  Under the law of
inventions, ideas remain the employee’s property until conception.  And because for
conception to occur the employee must take the affirmative step of creating written
                                                                                                                                           
secret as a result of contested litigation, even with the assistance of various protective orders, represents a
major deterrent to commencing the litigation in the first place.
60 Hyde, supra note 7.  The Oracle-Infomix incident is recounted in note 52, supra, and the accompanying
text.
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corroboration, an employee can choose to delay this event until after he leaves the
company.62
To be sure, the earlier in the invention process an employee must make the
decision to undertake a start-up, the riskier is the employee’s human capital investment in
the venture.63  However, it is important to stress that the litigation burden of proving
conception rests with the former employer who is claiming ownership.  Thus, in the case
of a legally sophisticated Silicon Valley employee who can be expected to know the
rules, the former employer will have to acquire through discovery precisely the
documents that the former employee knows would be damaging.  This knowledge allows
the former employee to behave strategically with respect to such documents, whether by
not retaining them, or by not creating them in the first place.
That leaves the application of trade secret law to pre-conception inventions.  Here
too, however, protection fails.  Merges states with respect to this concern that “while
trade secret law protects pure information in theory, in practice trade secret law actions
by ex-employers are rarely successful when the former employee(s) take nothing tangible
with them.”64
B. Protecting Tacit Knowledge and Inventions through a Covenant Not
to Compete
Were trade secret law the only way to protect employers against spillovers of
proprietary knowledge through employee mobility, the legal infrastructure would be an
                                                                                                                                           
61 Merges, supra note 49, at 37 (emphasis in the original).
62 Id. at 38. For present purposes, we can ignore statutory and common law differences in the default rules
regarding invention ownership depending on whether the employee was hired to do research, whether the
inventing employee used employer resources in the invention process, and whether the invention related to
the employer’s existing or contemplated business.  As long as the employee leaves before the invention’s
formal conception, the ownership rules influenced by these considerations do not apply.
63 See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 35.
64 Merges, supra note 49, at 38.
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unlikely candidate to explain the initial conditions that led to the different experiences of
Silicon Valley and Route 128.  Simply put, the legal infrastructures of the two districts do
not differ in material respects along this dimension: the scope of protection provided by
trade secret law in California and Massachusetts appears to be roughly the same.
Employers, however, have recourse to another, more effective way to prevent
employee disseminated spillovers of employer proprietary knowledge.  If the critical
mechanism by which spillovers occurs is through employee mobility, then an employer
can secure protection by causing existing employees to sign a post-employment covenant
not to compete.  In contrast to trade secret law, the legal infrastructures of Silicon Valley
and Route 128 differ dramatically along this dimension.
1. The Operation of Covenants Not to Compete.  A post-
employment covenant not to compete prevents knowledge spillover of an employer’s
proprietary knowledge not, as does trade secret law, by prohibiting its disclosure or use,
but by blocking the mechanism by which the spillover occurs: employees leaving to take
up employment with a competitor or to form a competing start-up.  Such a covenant
provides that, after the termination of employment for any reason, the employee will not
compete with the employer in the employer’s existing or contemplated businesses for a
designated period of time – typically one to two years – in a specified geographical
region that corresponds to the market in which the employer participates.
The logic of the provision reflects the limited useful life of knowledge in high
technology industries.  Given the speed of innovation and the corresponding telescoping
of product life cycles, knowledge more than a year or two old likely no longer has
significant competitive value.  The hiatus imposed by a covenant not to compete thus
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assures that a departing employee will bring to a new employer only her general and
industry specific human capital.  The value of proprietary tacit knowledge embedded in
the employee’s human capital, or the value of inchoate inventions the employee has
strategically chosen not to bring to conception during her employment, will have
dissipated over the covenant’s term. Nothing of value is left to spill over to a new
employer or start-up venture.
The availability of such a covenant has an obvious impact on the potential for an
industrial district to develop the second stage agglomeration economy that allowed
Silicon Valley to reset its product cycle.  The covenant operates to put a sharp brake on
employee mobility, the mechanism by which knowledge spillovers give rise to the critical
second stage agglomeration economy.  The widespread use and enforcement of covenants
not to compete slows down high velocity employment to the point where the level of
knowledge spillovers is too low to support a district wide innovation cycle.
It is with respect to the availability of covenants not to compete that the character
of the legal infrastructure helps explain the initial conditions that gave rise to the different
experiences of Silicon Valley and Route 128.  Under Massachusetts law, post-
employment covenants not to compete generally are enforceable.  Under California law,
they are not.  As we will see, this difference in starting point helps explain the different
capacities of the two industrial districts to generate the second stage agglomeration
economy necessary to reset a district’s product cycle.
2. The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete under Massachusetts Law.
Massachusetts law is generally representative of the approach taken toward post-
employment covenants not to compete by the great majority of states.  United States law
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in this area largely derives from English law that developed the basic pattern of blanket
enforcement of covenants not to compete given by the seller in connection with the sale
of a business, and the application of a rule of reason to covenants associated with
employment.  Covenants not to compete would be enforced against a departing employee
if the covenant's duration and geographic coverage were no greater than necessary to
protect an employer’s legitimate business interest, and not otherwise contrary to the
public interest.65  This formulation is commonplace in Massachusetts’ covenant cases,
and dates to the late 19th century.66
 Massachusetts law case developing the circumstances when a covenant not to
compete will be enforceable is large, somewhat inconsistent, and uses the language of
                                               
65 See generally ANTHONY C. VALIULIS, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 166 (1985); Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960).  As related by Valulis, the
development of English law regarding enforceability of post-employment covenants not to compete tells an
interesting tale of economic history.  The earliest statutes and case law, quite hostile to employment
restrictions, are said to have grown out of the extreme labor shortage following the Black Death in 1348.  In
1349, for example, the Ordinance of Labourers was enacted which, in effect, made voluntary
unemployment a crime.  Dyers’ Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f.f., pl. 26 (C.P. 1414), is said to have denied
enforcement of a bond against competition by a former employee, with the comment by one of the judges
that “[b]y God, if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until he paid a fine to the King.”  Valulis,
supra, at 156-57.  Changing economic circumstances, including the rise and decline of the guilds, led to the
development of a rule of reason.
The general approach in the United States is set our in RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 2D § 188
(1981):
(1)  A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise
valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or
(b)   the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely
injury to the public.
(2)  Promise imposing restraints that are ancillary  . . . include . . . :
 . . . 
(b)  a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other
principal; . . . 
66 See, e.g., Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacum Components, 968 F.2d 1463, 1468 (1st Cir. 1992)
(applying Massachusetts law under New Hampshire choice-of-law principles); Allied Adjustment Service
v. Heney, 125 N.H. 698, 700-02, 484 A.2d 1189 (applying Massachusetts law.  Blake, supra note 65, dates
the rule of reason formulation in Massachusetts to Morse v. Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Moore, 103 Mass.
73 (1869).  Massachusetts law is flexible in that a court will trim down an otherwise valid covenant whose
duration or geographic coverage is too great to the point that it is enforceable.  See All Stainless, Inc. v.
Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 777-79, 308 N.E.2d 481 (1974) (upholding two-year covenant not to compete for a
salesman but restricting the geographical area to the sales territory serviced prior to termination).
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trade secret law quite loosely.  In particular, judicial discussion of the interests of an
employer sufficient to support enforcement typically refers to a litany of acceptable
concerns: the protection of trade secrets, confidential information, and good will.67  This
formulation raises the specter that a covenant not to compete adds nothing to the trade
secret protection available without a separate covenant (and in California).  For present
purposes, my goal is neither to survey, nor to reconcile judicial precedent in
Massachusetts, but rather to focus on outcomes.  In this respect, Massachusetts law
accords significant impact to the presence of a post-employment covenant not to
compete.  A recent discussion by a Massachustts practitioner captures the additional
protection provided by a covenant:
It is often a practical impossibility for a former employee to
work in the same industry for a competitor without
employing or disclosing, even unconsciously, the
intellectual property of the former employer.  Indeed, that
intellectual property constitutes only one end of the
spectrum of the information, knowledge and expertise that
an employee develops in the course of working for an
employer.  The demarcation line between such information,
knowledge and expertise and truly proprietary information
may not be ascertainable.  Even if it were, it is difficult or
impossible for a company to determine whether a former
employee is honoring the obligation to refrain from using
information that is clearly over the line and into the
category of trade secret.  In these circumstances, a covenant
                                               
67 See, e.g., New England Canteen Service, Inc. v. Asley, 372 Mass. 671, 673-75, 363 N.E.2d 526 (1977)
(refusing to enforce non-competition covenant absent a showing of good will or similar interest damaged
by former employee’s competition); Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 365 Mass. 280, 286-87 (1974)
(upholding covenant not to compete where consideration was paid); All Stainless, 364 Mass. at 778 (1974)
(upholding two-year covenant not to compete for a salesman but restricting the geographical area to the
sales territory serviced prior to termination); Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Bdcst. Co., 357 Mass.
106, 111, 256 N.E.2d 304 (1970) (refusing to enforce a covenant not to compete against a former employee
where it would be mere ordinary competition and former employee knew no trade secrets); Wells v. Wells,
9 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 323, 400 N.E.2d 1317 (1980) (holding that “[E]mployee covenants not to compete
are enforceable only to the extent they are necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer.”);
National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Avers, 2 Mass. App 285, 288-91, 311 N.E.2d 573 (1974) (refusing to
enforce covenant against employee who did not appropriate any confidential customer information
belonging to employer).
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not to compete can provide an added measure of
protection.68
And the outcomes of litigated cases reflect the likelihood of enforcement.  Of the ten
decisions on preliminary injunctions to enforce a covenant not to compete between
February, 1994 and July, 1996, injunctions were granted in eight.69  Of special
importance, the availability of preliminary injunctive relief with respect to covenants not
to compete contrasts sharply with the unavailability of summary judgment in the case of
misappropriation of trade secrets.70
In all events, my purpose is not to show that covenants not to compete are
uniformly enforceable under Massachusetts law.  Rather, all I seek to establish is that
Massachusetts law represents an initial condition which could give rise to the Route 128
form of employment pattern, industrial organization, and business culture that Saxenian
describes.  If, as clearly seems to be the case under Massachusetts law, the probability
that a post-employment covenant not to compete will be enforced is sufficiently high, a
different career strategy would be dictated.  The risk to employees from changing
employers (and the risk to employers of hiring the former employees of competitors) or
organizing a start-up would encourage an employee to stay in her current job.  The
                                               
68 J. Charles Mokriski, Trade Secrets: Protect your Competitive Edge – or Perish, MASS. LAWYERS
WEEKLY, May 30, 1994, at 33.
69 Edmund C. Case, Recent Developments in ‘Non-Compete’ Litigation, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, July
15, 1996, at 11.  Comprehensive Technologies Intnl v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739 (4th Cir.
1993), makes the same point: “When an employee has access to confidential and trade secret information
crucial to the success of the employer’s business, the employer has a strong interest in enforcing a covenant
not to compete because other legal remedies will often prove inadequate.  It will often be difficult, if not
impossible,  to prove that a competing employee has misappropriated trade secrets belonging to his former
employer.”  See ROBERT P. MEGES, PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & THOMAS M. JORDE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 89 (1997) (“In a competitive industry,
preventing the disclosure of trade secrets is far preferable to suing for misappropriation after they have
already been disclosed.  A noncompetition agreement may be a reasonable way for an employer to prevent
a problem – and a lawsuit – before it starts.”)
70 See text accompanying note 58, supra.
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resulting dynamic would favor long-term career patterns, vertical integration and,
ultimately, internal rather than district wide innovation.  The initial condition – a legal
infrastructure that impedes employee mobility – gives rise to a complementary business
culture and institutions that, once established, supports a self-enforcing equilibrium.
Importantly, this aspect of Route 128’s legal infrastructure would not interfere
with the industrial district’s original development.  Route 128 grew out of university-
related agglomeration economies, a plentiful supply of skilled labor due to the presence
of Harvard and MIT, and the knowledge spillovers resulting from the University-run
World War II and Cold War research labs.  Because those laboratories were non-profit
organizations, it is highly unlikely that they secured covenants not to compete from their
employees.  Consistent with this analysis, a large number of Route 128 start-ups,
including DEC, were founded by scientists leaving these labs.71  However, the legal
infrastructure would present a barrier to the second stage agglomeration economy that
sustains a high technology district by allowing it to reset its product lifestyle, an economy
that did not develop in Route 128 but did in Silicon Valley.
3. California Law Governing Covenants Not to Compete.
California law governing covenants not to compete is both unusual, and radically
different than that of Massachusetts.  California Business and Professions Code § 16600
provides that “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent void.”72  The courts have
interpreted Section 16600 “as broadly as it reads.”73  Other than two statutory exceptions
                                               
71 See text accompanying note 16,  supra (fifty companies founded by scientists from MIT’s Lincoln Lab;
fifty five founded by scientists at the MIT Instrumentation Lab).
72 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
73 Scott v. Snelling and Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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that track the general rule outside of California which allow enforcement of covenants
not to compete associated with the sale of a business,74 the statute’s prohibition is
essentially unqualified.  For example, covenants that do not prohibit post-employment
competition, but merely to penalize it, are also prohibited.75  While there are decisions
suggesting in dicta that California courts may enforce a covenant not to compete when it
is necessary to protect trade secrets,76 I have uncovered no case in which a California
court actually enforced a covenant not to compete on that basis.77  Indeed, California
courts’ application of choice of law rules underscores the seriousness with which they
view Section 16600.  Even if the employment agreement which contains a post-
employment covenant not to compete explicitly designates the law of another state, under
which the covenant would be enforceable, as controlling, and even if that state has
                                               
74 The statutory exceptions cover sales of a business whether effected through the sale of the business’
assets, the sale of shares in a corporation, or the sale of a partnership interest.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
16601 (sale of goodwill or corporation shares; agreement not to compete), 16602 (partners; dissolution;
agreement not to compete) (West 1997).
75 See, e.g., Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Knobelauch, 653 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1991) (invalidating under 
16600 an employment contract term that required a departing employee to repay advances if the employee
competed); Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 43-44, 241 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1987)
(holding that discharging an employee for good cause for assisting employer’s competitors did not violate
the free competition policy behind Section 16600, as “agreements designed to protect an employer’s
proprietary information do not violate section 16600.”); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 24 CAL. APP. 3D 35, 100 CAL. RPTR. 791 (1972), aff’d, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (invalidating under 
16600 a profit-sharing plant term that caused a former employee to forfeit benefits if the employee engaged
in a competing business); Muggill v. Rueben H. Donnelly Corp., 62 CAL. 2D 239, 42 CAL. RPTR. 107
(1965) (invalidating a retirement plan term that caused a former employee to forfeit annuity payments if the
employee engaged in a competing business).
76 TransAmerican Collections, Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc. 342 F. SUPP. 1303, 1305
(D. Utah 1972) (covenant not to compete may be enforceable where necessary to protect trade secrets);
Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 CAL. 2D at 242 (covenants not to compete are unenforceable
“unless they are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets’); Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732
F. SUPP. at 1043 (“California courts recognize a judicially created exception to Section 16600 and will
enforce a covenant not to compete” to protect an employer’s trade secrets). Fowler v. Varian Associates,
Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 43-44, 241 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1987) (holding that discharging an employee for good
cause for assisting employer’s competitors did not violate the free competition policy behind Section
16600, as “agreements designed to protect an employer’s proprietary information do not violate section
16600.    
77 TransAmerican Collections upheld a covenant not to compete under Utah law; its statement of California
law was dicta. Muggill neither involved trade secrets, nor upheld anything.  Instead the case voided under 
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contacts with the contract, California courts nonetheless will apply  16600 on behalf of
California residents to invalidate the covenant.78
Perhaps there is a California case that I have missed which enforces a covenant
not to compete.  But just as I did not attempt in the previous section to establish that
Massachusetts courts always enforced covenants not to compete, I do not seek here to
demonstrate that California courts never enforce a covenant not to compete (although I
would not be surprised by that outcome).   Rather my point is the more limited one that
California’s legal infrastructure made it extremely unlikely that post-employment
covenants not to compete would be enforced.  Coupled with the limited usefulness of
trade secret law in California as elsewhere, Silicon Valley employers’ early efforts to
prevent employees leaving to compete with employers’ proprietary tacit knowledge
failed.  Employees learned that they could leave; employers learned that they could not
prevent high velocity employment and the resulting knowledge spillover.  And that legal
infrastructure caused employers, however reluctantly, to adopt a different strategy, one of
cooperation and competition, that generated a dynamic process leading to Silicon
Valley’s characteristic employee career pattern, lack of vertical integration, knowledge
spillovers and business culture.  Thus, the initial condition supplied by Silicon Valley’s
legal infrastructure ultimately gave rise to the conditions necessary to support a second
stage agglomeration economy, which allowed it to reset its product cycle, and to thrive
while Route 128 rode its product cycle down the curve.
                                                                                                                                           
16600 a provision of an employment agreement that terminated pension benefits if a former employee
competed.  Scott declined to enforce a covenant not to compete because it found no trade secrets to protect.
78 See Frame v. Merrill Lynch, 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673 (1971) (applying California law to invalidate
profit-sharing plan benefit termination on competition despite its validity under New York law, and a
contractual designation of New York law as controlling); Scott v. Snelling and Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp.
1034, 1039-40 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“Section 16600 has been held by the California courts to represent a
strong public policy which would override the choice of law provision in the contract . . . .”).
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4. Solving the Collective Action Problem.  The analysis in the
previous section sets out the role played by Business and Professions Code § 16600 as an
initial condition of the strategic dynamic set in place by the growth of Silicon Valley.  As
I argued in Part II, establishing a second stage agglomeration economy in the absence of
a supporting legal infrastructure poses a collective action problem for an industrial
district.  The collectively rational strategy is to allow high velocity employment, because
the per firm benefit of the economy exceeds the per firm cost of the intellectual property
dilution that results from the knowledge spillovers necessary to support the economy.
However, the individually rational strategy is for a single firm, and therefore every firm,
to take advantage of spillovers from the other firms but to restrict the mobility of its own
employees.  An inability to solve the coordination problem would then lock the district
into the suboptimal strategy (and resulting career patterns, industrial organization, and
business culture) dictated by the prisoners’ dilemma confronting the district.
The existence of Business and Professions Code § 16600 provided the
coordination mechanism necessary to overcome this prisoners’ dilemma barrier to
development of a second stage agglomeration economy.  By prohibiting covenants not to
compete, Section 16600 eliminated the only effective strategy for pursuing the
individually rational, but collectively suboptimal strategy.  No communication between
firms was necessary to this cooperative outcome.  Each firm could discover
independently (or from observing the experience of their competitors) that trying to
restrict employee mobility was ineffective.  At that point, the optimal individual strategy
and the optimal collective strategy converged: Silicon Valley’s legal infrastructure, in the
form of Business and Profession Code § 16600’s prohibition of covenants not to
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compete, provided a pole around which Silicon Valley’s characteristic business culture
and structure precipitated.
5. An Alternative Explanation.  Allan Hyde has told a different
story about the source of high velocity employment in Silicon Valley.  While his account
shares my emphasis on the importance of the legal infrastructure, he finds the critical
element not the prohibition of covenants not to compete, but California’s effective
elimination of trade secret protection.79  While I agree with much of Professor Hyde’s
insightful analysis of the phenomenon that has claimed both of our attentions, on the
question of identifying the operative element of Silicon Valley’s legal infrastructure, I am
afraid he has the wrong culprit.
Hyde rejects the influence of covenants not to compete, based largely on the dicta
in a number of cases that Section 16600 does not prohibit covenants not to compete in
support of trade secrets.  Because misappropriation of trade secrets is independently
prohibited, and if covenants not to compete are enforceable if a trade secret is established,
then in his analysis covenants not to compete add nothing to whatever protection is
already provided by trade secret law.  The operative element therefore must be the extent
of trade secret protection.  And the difference between Silicon Valley and Route 128’s
legal infrastructure then must be a difference in the rigor of trade secret law in California
and Massachusetts.
My initial problem with the analysis is that Professor Hyde provides neither case
law nor commentary supporting the proposition that California trade secret law is less
favorable to employers than that of Massachusetts.  Indeed, the formal evidence cuts the
other way.  When California adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1985, it made a
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significant change in the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’
model statute.  The model statute defines the confidentiality element of the definition of a
trade secret as information that derives value “from not being generally know to, and not
being readily ascertainable to, other persons. . . .”80  Under this provision, all trade secret
protection is lost if a trade secret is available through public sources, regardless of
whether a defendant actually obtained the trade secret in so innocent a manner.81  The
California legislature deleted the italicized phrase, thereby providing broader trade secret
protection than the model act.82  So if there was a narrowing of trade secret protection in
California, the culprit was not the legislature.
Perhaps the culprit was the courts, although Hyde does not offer case support for
the proposition that California judges uniquely weakened trade secret protection.  Nor
does Hyde offer an explanation of the dynamic by which judicial respect for trade secret
protection deteriorated.  While courts had to confront Section 16600 at the time the
conflict over employee mobility began in the early years of Silicon Valley, what moved
them to dilute trade secret protection over the vigorous objections of this new business
community?  And why was the outcome different than in Massachusetts?  One might
echo Saxanian’s proffer of culture, but as we have seen that still leaves us in search of an
explanation for the culture.83
                                                                                                                                           
79 Hyde, supra note 7.
80 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985) (emphasis added).
81 Merges et al., supra note 69, at 44-45.
82 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3246.1(d)(1).  See ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Ct. App. 1991)
(customer list can be a trade secret even if the information it contains was available from a trade directory).
83 There is evidence, of the variety captured by the comment that a lawyer's definition of data is the plural
of anecdote, that real actors think the difference between California and Massachusetts law governing
covenants not to compete makes a difference.  In Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components,
968 F.2d 1463 (1st Cir. 1992), Ferrofluidics Corp., a producer of magnetic rotary seal used in the
manufacture of semiconductor chips, hired Sickles as a product manager of its Seals Division in 1985, and
thereafter promoted him to general manager of the division.  In 1990, when "Ferro was suffering, along
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In the end, Hyde’s perfunctory concern with the California courts and legislature
is best explained by his interesting identification of a different suspect.  He argues that
Silicon Valley lawyers subverted trade secret protection.  Here Hyde draws on a literature
that assigns these lawyers the special “West coast” transactional role of facilitator rather
than the East coast role of problem raiser.84  Hyde reports that Silicon Valley lawyers
who, in connection with the closing of a venture capital financing, provide investors with
the required legal opinion that the start-up company has the right to use its technology,
employ a narrower definition of trade secret than the courts and the California statute.
The explanation for this practice is that the lawyers know that the former employer of the
start-up’s founders will not sue anyway.  In Hyde’s view this protection comes not
necessarily because trade secret law is unfavorable, but because the reputational
consequences to the former employer in the labor market will outweigh the gains from
enforcing its intellectual property rights. 85  Anticipating this analysis, lawyers are more
aggressive in their opinions than the law on the books alone would warrant, because a
claim will never be made challenging their opinion.
                                                                                                                                           
with much of the New England high-technology industry, from a downturn in the economy," Sickles
accepted an offer from the Nippon Ferrofluidics Corporation (which has been Ferro's Japanese investor) to
start a competing magnetic seal rotary fluid business in the United States.  Id. at 1466.
Sickles moved to California to start the new venture, Advanced Vacuum Components (AVC), in
the hope that he could evade his noncompete covenant by subjecting the new business to California law.
Sickles had "received advice from lawyers on several occasions, some of which he in turn related to NFC,
including the nugget that '[l]egal complications will be greatly reduced by incorporating [the new venture]
in California since this state strongly protects the entrepreneur and, in general, does not recognize non-
compete agreements.'"  Id.  In 1991, AVC and Ferro "raced to the courthouse":  AVC requested a judicial
declaration invalidating his restrictive covenant under California law; Ferro initiated a lawsuit to enforce
the covenant in New Hampshire Federal District Court (which applied Massachusetts law under the terms
of the covenant itself).  Ferro won the race and was able to enforce the covenant for three years through a
permanent injunction.  Id.
84 See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of
Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQ. 679 (1996).
85 Hyde, supra note 7.
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Reliance on reputational effects is not helpful here, because the reputation
argument presumes a business culture that supports a self-enforcing equilibrium.  Yet,
explaining the existence of that business culture is, in the end, the point of trying to
establish the initial conditions giving rise to the second stage agglomeration economy in
the first place. Moreover, we still have no explanation for the origins of the differences
between the two districts’ legal infrastructure.  Finally, there is also a more
straightforward explanation for the Silicon Valley lawyers’ conduct.  As I argued in Part
III.A., enforcement of trade secret claims in Massachusetts confronts significant
procedural and substantive barriers.  The opinions said to be given by Silicon Valley
lawyers are also consistent with what appears to be the “law in action” in Massachusetts,
for precisely the reasons covenants not to compete are said to provide employers critical
additional protection in that jurisdiction.
In the end,  the difference in their treatments of post-employment covenants not to
compete remains the most likely difference in the legal infrastructures of Silicon Valley
and Route 128 that led the two districts down their ultimately quite different paths.  But
although the analysis thus far explains the importance of the legal infrastructure to high
technology industrial districts, it still is one step short of explaining the source of the
initial conditions in Silicon Valley.
IV. Serendipity
Identifying Business and Professions Code § 16600 as the pole around which
Route 128’s distinct business culture precipitated still leaves one critical question
unanswered.  To specify fully the initial conditions that led to the second stage
agglomeration economy which provided Silicon Valley’s salvation we need to know
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from where this unusual statute came.  And here the special role of serendipity, of the
importance of historical accident stressed by Arthur and Krugman, takes center stage.
Section 16600 was not the result not of the prescience of the California legislature.
Rather, it grew out of the nineteenth century coincidence of the codification movement in
American law, personified by the efforts of David Dudley Field in New York, and the
need for a new state to bring some order to the chaotic condition of its laws following its
admission to the union.
The history of California Business and Professions Code § 16600 begins in New
York in 1847.  In that year, Field was appointed as one of three commissioners charged
by the recently adopted New York state constitution “to revise, reform, simplify, and
abridge the rules and practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings of the courts of record of
this state.”86  Field dominated the process, which resulted in a revolutionary civil
procedure code that the New York legislature promptly enacted.87   Field’s codification
efforts continued in 1857, when the New York legislature appointed him to a Code
Commission charged with codifying substantive law.  Despite the controversy associated
with his efforts,88 Field produced a Civil Code in 1865.89  Because of the controversy
associated with his efforts, the Civil Code was never enacted in New York.90  Instead, it
found its only home in the West.  The needs of newly admitted states, including
                                               
86 NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, art. VI,  24 (1846).
87 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 340 (2d ed. 1985).
88 Friedman notes: “the codification movement is one of the great set pieces of American legal history.  It
has its hero, Field; its villain in James C. Carter of New York who fought the idea of codification with as
much vigor as Field fought for it.”  Id. at 351.
89 DAVID VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW 51 (1986).
90 The Civil Code was passed by both houses of the New York legislature between 1879 and 1882, but was
vetoed by the Governor both times.  Id. at 101.  It was never adopted in New York.  Reisman places the
Civil Code at the very center of the conflict over codification: “The bone of contention . . . was the Civil
Code – for Field the centerpiece of his whole agenda, for Carter its truly pernicious part.”  Mathias
Reisman, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter and the Defeat of the New York
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especially California, to impose some order on jurisdictions with conflicting legal
traditions and no single body of law coincided with the peak of Field’s codification
crusade.91  Field found a special ally in California, his brother Stephen J. Field, a member
of the California legislature at the time the state adopted Field’s Civil Procedure Code in
1851, and later Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and an Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court.92
In 1850 California had officially adopted the “common law of England”93 to
supplant pre-statehood Spanish and Mexican law.  However, the extensive reach of the
old Mexican land grant system, together with the overriding Federal exceptions carved
out by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which ended the Mexican-American War in
1848, diminished the effect of legislation attempting to abolish and repeal all prior law in
California.94  Consequently, throughout the 1860s, a series of governors, including
Leland Stanford, urged a codification of California’s laws.95  After a false start in 1868,
                                                                                                                                           
Civil Code, 37 AM. J .COMP. L. 95, 100 (1989).  Field’s Code Commission also produced a Political Code
in 1860, and a Penal Code in 1864.  The Penal Code was ultimately adopted in 1882.  Id. at 50, 99.
91 ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE, WEST’S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, CIVIL
CODE 1 (1954) (“From the raising of the American flag by Commodore Sloat at Monterey on July 7, 1846,
to the organization of constitutional state government in 1849, the legal history of California is one of
disorder and confusion.”); Rosamond Parma, The History of the Adoption of the Codes of California, 22 L.
LIBR. J. 8 (1929) (outlining the disarray of California law at the time it entered the Union in 1850).
92 VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 91, at 6.
93 “[S]o far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the laws of
the State of California.”  CAL. STATS. 1850, ch. 95.
94 “[A]ll laws now in force in this state, except such as have been passed or adopted by the legislature, are
hereby repealed, provided, however, that no rights accrues, contracts made or suits shall be effected
thereby, and providing that the law relating to ‘Jueces del Campo’ or Judges of the Plains shall be excepted,
until provision is made for that office by law; and provided, also that such repeal shall not affect any
constitutional laws or acts of Congress, or any of the stipulations contained in the Treaty of Peace between
the United States and Mexico, ratified at Queretaro, the 30th day of May, 1848.”  CAL. STATS. 1850, ch.
125.
95 Parma, supra note 91, at 13.
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the legislature in 1870 appointed a Commission to revise and compile the laws of the
State of California.96
The Commission moved promptly the next year to adopt Field’s proposed New
York Civil Code in total.97  Indeed, the Commission’s original version of the California
Civil Code contained most of the New York Commission’s annotations, although as
adopted by the legislature in 1872 the Code replaced the direct citations to the New York
Civil Code with references to California cases.  It was in Section 833 of Field’s proposed
New York Code, adopted verbatim by the California legislature in 1872,98 that we find
the precursor of Business and Professions Code § 16600.
Section 833 of the proposed New York Civil Code and the § 1872 California Civil
Code provided the general rule:
Section 833.  Every Contract by which anyone is restrained from
exercising a lawful trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as
provided by the next two sections, is to that extent void.
The following two sections contained exceptions for covenants not to
compete in  connection with the sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership:
                                               
96 A Commission was appointed in May, 1868, but committed political suicide by announcing its intention
to repeal the grand jury system.  The legislature disbanded the original Commission and empowered its
replacement to disregard the work of its predecessors.  Id. at 14-15.
97 In their preface to the draft of the Civil Code, the Commission states: “The citizen and lawyer alike
complain over the want of a condensed methodical expression of the law.  The Civil Code of New York – a
monument of legal wisdom and patient industry – is a collection of Common Law rules and principles,
combined with a consolidation of statutes like our own, all concisely stated, logically and harmoniously
arranged, in order of subjects corresponding to Blackstone’s Commentaries.”  CODE COMMISSIONERS,
REVISED LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA iv (1871).
98 Following California’s lead, the Dakota Territory adopted a similar Civil code in 1877, which also
acknowledged the influence of the New York Civil Code and the more recent California Civil Code.
DAKOTA CIV. CODE (1895).  When the territory became two separate states, each retained the Code.
Montana followed in 1895 with a similar civil code, also acknowledging New York and California.
Montana Civ. Code (1895).  See Andrew P. Morriss, This State will Soon Have Plenty of Laws, Lessons
from One Hundred years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 359 (1995).  Lawrence Friedman
provides an interesting explanation of the Field Civil Code’s success in the West: “The success of the codes
in the West was due to reasons that by now are familiar.  These were sparsely settled states in a hurry to
ingest a legal system.  A few had something of a civil law tradition.  In none of the Western states did the
bar have a strong vested interest in the continuance of the old rules, especially of pleading.”  FRIEDMAN,
supra note 87, at 353-53.
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Section 834.  One who sells the good will of a business may agree
with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within
a specified county, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving
title to the good will through him, carries on a like business.
Section 835.  Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution
of a partnership, agree that none of them will carry on a similar
business within the same city or town where the partnership
business has been transacted, or within a specified part thereof.
Parts of Field’s formulation reflected the state of the law on restraints at that time
in New York and elsewhere.  By this point, courts in England applied a rule of reason to
evaluating contractual restrictions on the conduct of a trade or business.  From the time of
Mitchel v. Reynolds in 1711,99 English law distinguished between post-employment
contractual restraints on employees, and restraints arising out of the sale of a business.
The latter were generally upheld, but the former were held to more rigorous scrutiny and
unreasonable restraints – in duration or coverage – were struck down.  This approach
ultimately grew into a “rule of reason” that required judicial balancing of interests,
including those of the public, in determining a restriction’s validity.  American law
generally followed the English pattern, albeit with special concern for the interests of
employees.  But except for a period in which general restrictions – those whose
application was not limited geographically – were routinely invalidated, American courts
did not apply a per se rule of invalidity with respect to either post-employment restraints
or those associated with the sale of a business.100
For our purposes, the sequence of Sections 833 through 835 differs from the
existing body of law in one critical respect.  While sections 834 and 835 carry forward
the existing law’s sanction of covenants not to compete associated with the sale of a
                                               
99 1 P. Will. 181 (1711).
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business, Section 833 voids all other restraints, including especially post-employment
covenants not to compete.
It is impossible to know exactly what Field had in mind in this sequence.  These
sections were added late in the development of the Code, and had not been part of the
preliminary draft circulated to judges and lawyers in 1862.101  The comment to section
833 expresses a concern that “contracts in restraint of trade have been allowed, by
modern decisions, to a very dangerous extent,” and refers to two cases: Dunlop v.
Gregory,102 and Whittaker v. Howe.103  Both cases involve non-competition covenants
associated with the sale of a business.  In Dunlop v. Gregory, the  Hudson River
Steamboat Association, which operated a passenger service on the Hudson River between
New York, Albany and Troy, owned five boats outright, and two-thirds of a sixth.  A
covenant not to operate a passenger boat north of Saugerties on the Hudson was attached
to the Association’s purchase of the remaining one-third interest in the jointly owned
boat.  In Whittaker v. Howe, a covenant not to compete anywhere in Great Britain was
attached to the sale of a law practice. The comment to section 833 makes no reference to
post-employment covenants not to compete. 104
The comments to the California Civil Code provide no more guidance.  Sections
833 through 835 of the proposed New York Code became sections 1673 through 1675 of
the California Civil Code.  The California Code Commissioners’ 1871 draft contains only
a citation to the New York section, and the text of the New York comment.105  The 1872
                                                                                                                                           
100 Blake, supra note 65, at 629-44, develops this history.
101 Compare N.Y. CIV. CODE § 833 (1865) with N.Y. CIV. CODE (draft 1862).
102 10 N.Y. 241 (1851).
103 3 Beav. 383 (Chancery 1841).
104 The comments to Sections 834 and 835 add nothing to the analysis.  Both refer only to the need to
accurately specify the breadth of an allowable covenant not to compete, and neither contains case citations.
105 REVISED LAWS OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA, § 1673 (1871).
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official version expands the original New York comment to include references to
California cases.106   However, these cases, like those discussed by the New York
annotation, do not deal with post-employment covenants not to compete.
Thus, beginning with the enactment of the Civil Code in 1872, California law on
post-employment covenants not to compete diverged from that of Massachusetts and the
rest of the large industrial states.  The rule of reason, clearly in place in Massachusetts by
1869107 and adopted in New York by 1887,108 came to cover post-employment covenants.
Subsequent revision of the California codes made minor changes in the language of §§
1673 through 1675, and moved the sections from the Civil Code to their present place as
Sections 16600 through 16602 of the Business and Professions Code.  However, the
substantive peculiarity of California law remained intact until the 1960s.109  At that point
the development of a high technology industrial district in Silicon Valley brought this
serendipitous element of California’s legal infrastructure to center stage.   Field’s
accident of history then served as the coordinating mechanism which supported a second
stage agglomeration economy – the pole around which Silicon Valley’s unusual business
culture and industrial organization precipitated.  The rest, as they say, is history.
                                               
106 See More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251, 254-55 (1870) (involving a contract not to practice asphalt roofing or
pavement laying if the purchaser of tools for such business became delinquent in his payments); Wright v.
Ryder, 36 Cal. 342, 361 (1868) (involving a contract upon sale of a boat not to allow that boat to run on any
rivers, bays, or waters of the State of California); California Steamboat Navigation Co. v. Wright, 6 Cal.
258, 262 (1856) (involving a contract not to allow a boat to navigate certain waters of California for three
years where consideration was paid).
107 See Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Moore, 103 Mass. 73 (1869).
108 See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
109 The growth in the size of the Civil Code resulted in the biggest change: its dismemberment.  The 1930
Code Commission suggested that portions of the Civil Code be broken off into separate codes.  VAN
ALSTYNE, supra note 91, at 24.  The Probate Code was the first spinoff in 1931, CAL. STATS. 1931, ch.
281, p. 587, repealing CIVIL CODE §§ 236-257, 1270-1409.  The Business and Professions Code was
created in 1937.  CAL. STATS. 1937, p. 1229.  Sections 16600 through 16602 were added to the Business
and Professions Code, and Sections 1673 through 1675 were deleted from the Civil Code in in 1941.  CAL.
STATS. 1941, ch. 526, § 1 (noting derivation from Civil Code §§ 1673-75).  The new section 16601 was
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V. Implications: Three Cautionary Notes
My account of the role of the legal infrastructure of high technology industrial
districts is now complete.  The new economic geography stresses the importance of initial
conditions in shaping an industrial district’s business culture and industrial organization.
The presence in Silicon Valley of a second stage agglomeration economy based on inter-
company knowledge spillovers has allowed that district to repeatedly reset its product
cycle. The absence of such spillovers in Route 128 has left that district to ride down the
product cycle associated with the minicomputer.  The difference in initial conditions that
helps account for the incidence of this economy and the resulting difference in the two
districts’ long-term success is found in a critical difference in the two districts’ legal
infrastructures.  The rules governing the effectiveness of employer imposed restraints on
employee mobility, the mechanism by which inter-company knowledge spillover takes
place, differ sharply in the two districts.  Massachusetts law generally enforces such
restraints, thereby effectively blocking the critical knowledge spillovers; California law
voids them, thereby encouraging knowledge spillovers.
Each legal infrastructure gave rise to a dynamic that helped shape each district’s
characteristic business culture and industrial organization, one compatible with
development of a second stage agglomeration economy and one not.  Consistent with the
new economic geography’s emphasis on the importance of historical accident, the
explanation for the two districts’ different legal infrastructure lies in the temporal
coincidence of California’s need for a coherent body of law following statehood, and
David Dudley Field’s proposed New York Civil Code.  In 1872, California adopted
                                                                                                                                           
expanded to include sales of corporate shares as well as sales of good will, but the broad prohibition of
employee post-employment covenants remained undisturbed.
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without explanation Field’s proposed prohibition of post-employment covenants not to
compete; Massachusetts, like most other industrial states, instead followed a rule of
reason that sanctioned such covenants subject to judicial review of their duration and
coverage.
Like any good story, my chronicle of the importance of the legal infrastructure of
high technology industrial districts has a number of possible morals, of potentially
instructive implications for related debates.  In closing I want to take up briefly three such
implications.  The first concerns the story’s implications for the standard law and
economics account of the importance of completely protecting property rights in
intellectual property.  The second deals with a recent line of cases involving claims of
“inevitable disclosure” by departing employees that threatens to turn trade secret law into
a judicially imposed de facto covenant not to compete.  The third considers the story’s
lesson for regional planners seeking to establish or preserve industrial districts.  While
each of these implications warrants far more attention than is possible here, I want to add
a cautionary note that counsels in favor of a more textured, less categorical analysis in
each case.
A. The Conflict Between Protecting Property Rights in Intellectual
Capital and Second Stage Agglomeration Economies
The standard law and economics prescription stresses the importance of fully
protecting the property rights of the producers of intellectual property.  In the absence of
complete protection, producers will not capture all of the gains resulting from their
efforts, and too little intellectual property will be produced.110  The importance of inter-
                                               
110 MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMICS
ANALYSIS 152-53 (1986), makes the standard argument with respect to giving California employers more
tools to protect their intellectual property against departing employees.  Edmund W. Kitch, The  Law and
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employer knowledge spillovers to the second stage agglomeration economy that has
preserved Silicon Valley sounds a note of caution with respect to an unqualified
application of the standard analysis.   We may need a more textured approach that takes
into account the benefit of an industrial district preserving agglomeration economy.111
As I suggested earlier,112 the comparison is between the average per firm cost of diluted
intellectual property protection and the average per firm benefit associated with the
preservation of the high technology industrial district.
Of course, which direction the comparison favors is an empirical question, and
one that should not be resolved with, as Professor Trebilcock puts it, “casual empiricism
that proves nothing.”113  But the difference in performance of Silicon Valley and Route
128 is a little more than casual and, in all events, the absence of empirical evidence
hardly resolves the matter in favor of either side of the argument.
We can perhaps advance the issue by using Silicon Valley to frame a kind of
sensitivity analysis.  The fact is that firms in Silicon Valley have always been free to opt
out of California’s legal infrastructure.  A firm need only move its intellectual property
producing activities out of California to avoid the property rights diluting effect of
Business and Professions Code § 16600.114  If in the calculus of a particular firm the cost
of diluted property rights protection outweighs the benefit of the agglomeration economy
by more than the firm’s and its employees’ relocation costs, the firm can simply move to,
                                                                                                                                           
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 683 ( 1980), also develops this analysis,
although he recognizes the anomaly presented by Silicon Valley.  Id. at 710.
111 Alan Hyde, supra note 7,  also develops this point, although our emphasis differs.
112 See the text following note 78, supra.
113 TREBILCOCK, supra note 110, at 153.
 114 Indeed, that strategy would have reduced the role of Section 16600 as a coordinating mechanism
because an alternative strategy to acceptance of high velocity employment would thereby be available.  A
firm could exit.
115 See SAXENIAN, supra note 8, at 93-94.
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say, Massachusetts.  And if the matter were as simple as an unqualified property rights
analysis would have it,  one would have expected waves of defections.  To be sure, some
companies have moved operations out of Silicon Valley.  However, the migration appears
to be of manufacturing and assembly operations, presumably motivated by the increased
factor prices resulting from congestion, rather than the innovative activities whose
location would be influenced by the level of intellectual property protection.115  Empirical
evidence concerning this sort of balance of trade may be available to help resolve the
dispute, or at least move the analysis forward.
One piece of casual empiricism, however, should be noted, if only to highlight the
kind of phenomenon an unqualified property rights analysis will have to explain.
Recently, the large Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis AG announced that it would
invest $250 million in a proprietary research institute in genomics, an aspect of
biotechnology with respect to which the large pharmaceuticals have typically bought
expertise, rather than develop it themselves.116  This investment has as its sole purpose
the creation of intellectual property.  Where, then, does Novartis site its new intellectual
property factory: where the legal infrastructure fully protects intellectual property rights,
or where the company will have the benefit of an industrial district?  The new facility will
be located in La Jolla, California, a burgeoning biotech industrial district117 that is, of
course, subject to California Business and Professions Code § 16600.118
B. Resisting Inevitable Disclosure Analysis in California
                                               
116 See Novartis Plans to Build Genetic-Research Center, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at A4.
117 See David Audretsch & Paula Stephan, Company-Scientist Locational Links: The Case of
Biotechnology, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 641 (1996)(concentration of biotech firms in San Diego area).
118 To be sure, Novartis had a more focused reason for locating the facility in La Jolla.  It will be build
adjacent to the Scripps Research Institute, “with which Novartis already has a 10 year, $200 million
agreement giving Novartis first rights of refusal to discoveries.”  Id.  But this kind of clustering is precisely
what is said to result from agglomeration economies.
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The “inevitable disclosure” line of cases in trade secret law represents the
doctrinal analogue to the classic law and economics emphasis on fully protecting
property rights in intellectual property.  Under this doctrine, some courts have
constructed a non-contractual covenant not to compete by enjoining a departing
employee from beginning a new job with a competitor of the former employer.  The
injunction is based on a finding that because of the nature of the trade secrets involved,
the employee must inevitably use or disclose them in working for a competitor,
regardless of the employee’s good faith.  California courts have not yet considered the
inevitable disclosure doctrine, but California practitioners have begun to raise it as an
alternative to contractual post-employment restrictions.119  The importance of a
knowledge spillover-based second stage agglomeration economy to Silicon Valley’s
repeated renewal strongly suggests that California courts should be quite cautious in
allowing the use of an inevitable disclosure claim to evade Business and Professions
Code § 16600.  The straightforward application of the doctrine should not seriously test a
California court’s resolve.  A more oblique application of the doctrine, which better fits
dicta in existing California case law, is a more serious threat.
Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond120 illustrates the potential reach of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine.  The litigation was triggered when Quaker Oats hired Redmond, then
Pepsico’s manager of California sports drink operations, as vice president-field
operations for Quaker Oat’s Gatorade brand.  At the time Redmond was hired, Pepsico
had begun a new marketing and promotion campaign for its “All Sports” beverage, which
directly competed with Gatorade.  Although Redmond had not signed a post-employment
                                               
119 See Weiss, Lincoln & Farrell, supra note 57, at 7-8.
59
covenant not to compete, Pepsico sought an injunction barring Redmond from working
for Quaker Oats based on the theory that Redmond would inevitably disclose Pepsico’s
trade secrets.121  Relying on the Illinois version of the UTA, the court concluded that
Redmond could not help but make use of his knowledge of Pepsico’s proprietary pricing,
marketing, and promotion strategies for its sports drink when undertaking precisely the
same responsibilities for Quaker Oats’ competing brand.  How could Redmond plan a
strategy for Quaker Oats without relying on what he knew would be Pepsico’s reaction?
As the district court concluded, “unless Redmond possessed an uncanny ability to
compartmentalize information, he would necessarily be making decisions about Gatorade
and Snapple by relying on his knowledge of [Pepsico’s] trade secrets.”122  On that basis,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order prohibiting Redmond from
beginning work at Quaker Oats for six months.
Pepsico illustrates the problem the inevitable disclosure doctrine presents for
California courts.  Suppose Redmond’s new job been in California, rather than his old
one.  California law then would have governed the issue.  The statutory conflict for a
California court is straightforward.  On the one hand, Business and Professions Code
 16600 prohibits post-employment covenants not to compete.  On the other hand,
California’s version of the UTA authorizes injunctive relief against misappropriation of
trade secrets.123  Preventing misappropriation by enjoining employment creates the
statutory friction.
                                                                                                                                           
120 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
121 Presumably the absence of a contractual covenant not to compete reflected the California situs of
Redmond’s Pepsico employment and the existence of Business and Professions Code  16600.  The case
was decided under Illinois law.
122 54 F. 3d at 1269.
123 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1997).
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More specifically, the inevitable disclosure doctrine threatens just the type of
knowledge whose spillover has been so critical to Silicon Valley.  It is the very character
of tacit knowledge that an employee cannot avoid its use.  To take an obvious example, a
high technology employee frequently learns not only how to make a product, but how not
to make it as well – that is, what manufacturing techniques do not work.  Knowledge that
particular approaches are ineffectual is very valuable in a fast moving high technology
industry; the time saved not going down dead ends means getting a product to market
sooner.  How does an employee not use his former employer’s proprietary knowledge
that an approach will not work if he is working in the same area for a competitor?
The inevitable disclosure doctrine remains controversial outside of California.
Although one court has followed Pepsico in enjoining competing employment in the
absence of a post-employment covenant not to compete,124 others have rejected requests
for injunctive relief in the absence of  covenant,125 sometimes stating explicitly that this
area is for contract.126  Moreover, the cases lend themselves to resolution based on a close
parsing of the facts.  Consistent with the judicial balancing associated with rule of reason
review of contractual post-employment restrictions (and the standard balancing of the
equities required for injunctive relief), courts relying on the inevitable disclosure doctrine
have stressed employee misbehavior in justifying an injunction.
The inevitable disclosure doctrine can be presented to California courts in two
ways: directly in support of injunctive relief despite the absence of a post-employment
                                               
124 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
125 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467 (1st Cir. 1996); Cudhay v. American Laboratories,
Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Neb. 1970).
126 The district court in Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, supra, stated that “if Campbell had wanted to protect
itself against the competition of former employees, it should have done so by contract.  This court will not
afford such protection after the fact.”  Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, Slip Op. 94-40177-NMG (D. Mass.
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not to compete; and indirectly in support of enforcement of an existing contractual
restriction.  California courts are likely to confront the issue first in its direct form.127
Given the state’s long history of prohibiting covenants not to compete, few firms will
have required their employees to sign contracts widely understood in the legal and
business communities to be unenforceable.  In this guise, a California court should have
little difficulty concluding that Business and Professions Code § 16600 forecloses the use
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine to create a de facto covenant not to compete.
California courts routinely have seen through other efforts to accomplish indirectly what
Section 16600 prohibits directly. 128  The UTA’s general authorization of injunctive relief
hardly trumps such a long-standing and specific statutory prohibition.129
When presented in its indirect form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is more
troublesome.  While Section 16600 and the UTA plainly face in different directions,
California case law does suggest an accommodation of the two statutes that would leave
room at least doctrinally for enforcing trade secret based post-employment restrictions.
Although in dicta, the California Supreme Court has stated that covenants not to compete
are unenforceable “unless necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets,130  a phrase
that has been repeated, equally hypothetically, by other courts.  Now suppose that a well
                                                                                                                                           
Dec. 12, 1994) (quoted in Anthony A. Bongiorno & James J. Marcellino, Noncompetes: Worth Their
Weight in Paper?, MASS. LAWYERS WKLY., Oct. 28, 1996, p.11.
127 The inevitable disclosure doctrine is said to be before the California Superior Court for Santa Clara
County in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.  v. Hyundai Electronics America, No. CV752679, Santa Clara
Superior Court.  Weiss, Lincoln & Farrell, supra note 57, describe an unpublished order in that case
granting a preliminary injunction enjoining five former Advanced Micro Devices employees from working
on a specific technology at a new employer.  See Hanna Bui-Eve, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon
Valley Companies Should Know About Hiring Competitor’s Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981, 998 (1997).
128 See note 75, supra.
129 Post-Pepsico case law is consistent with this distinction.  In most cases, inevitable disclosure analysis is
invoked by litigants to justify enforcing a contractual post-employment not to compete under the rule of
reason.  See Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 991 F. Supp 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v.
O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996); La Calhene, Inc. v. Spoylar, 938 F. Supp 523 (W.D. Wis.
1996); APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
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counseled employer requires a recent employee to sign a post-employment covenant not
to compete whose recitations explicitly invoke the involuntary disclosure doctrine as a
justification: that the employee must receive the employer’s trade secrets in order to do
her work, that the trade secrets are of a character that inevitably would be disclosed if the
employer worked for a competitor, and that the covenant not to compete is necessary to
protect them.  Later, when the employer seeks to enforce the covenant not to compete
against the departing employee, the inevitable disclosure doctrine can be rationalized as
simply giving substance to an exception to Business and Professions Code § 16600 the
potential for which has long been recognized in California law.  Of course, such a
rationalization would find theoretical support in the law and economics emphasis on
protecting property rights to assure the proper incentives to produce intellectual property.
The doctrinal sleight of hand necessary for the inevitable disclosure doctrine’s
indirect application in California thus does not require a significant judicial stretch.  But
the analysis here of the initial conditions giving rise to Silicon Valley’s second stage
agglomeration economy admonishes California courts to exercise great caution before
pursuing such an accommodation.   Inevitable disclosure doctrine poses a serious threat
to the inter-employer spillover of proprietary tacit knowledge that allows Silicon Valley
to repeatedly reset its product cycle.  Given the uncertainty of the theoretical tradeoff
between fully protecting property rights and protecting the agglomeration economy that
supports the industrial district, courts should be reluctant to alter the legal infrastructure
that preserves the existing, and successful, balance.131
                                                                                                                                           
130 Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 62 Cal. 2d at 242.  See text accompanying note 76, infra.
131 The doctrinal response to the indirect invocation of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is also not difficult
to construct.  The cases in which courts have floated the possibility that a covenant not to compete could be
used to protect a trade secret, have involved a tangible trade secret, like customer lists.  As a result, a court
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C. Emulating Silicon Valley’s Success by Prohibiting Covenants not to
Compete
My account of the legal infrastructure’s role in Silicon Valley’s continued success
has an obvious implication for regional planners seeking to create or preserve local
industrial districts: Simply replicate that aspect of the legal infrastructure that provided
the critical initial condition.  On this analysis, the planner should persuade her state's
legislature to emulate California by enacting the equivalent of Business and Professions
Code § 16600’s prohibition of post-employment covenants not to compete.  Again,
however, I think caution is in order in assessing the policy implications of Silicon
Valley’s history.
Evaluating the prohibition of covenants not to compete reflects a trade off
between the district wide benefits of knowledge spillovers through employee mobility,
and the costs of the parallel reduction in the incentive to invest in intellectual property
that results from the dilution of employers’ property rights.  With respect to Silicon
Valley and Route 128, the balance seems to have favored agglomeration economies over
property rights protection.  However, this balance may well be quite local, depending on
the characteristics of particular industries.  And because industries are not randomly
distributed across jurisdictions, each state’s particular industrial population may dictate a
different balance.  Rather than emulating California’s blanket prohibition (which after all
exists by historical accident not design), it may be that the rule of reason currently
                                                                                                                                           
is in a position to enforce a very narrow definition of competition – one limited to the trade secret’s
particular tangible manifestation.  In effect, the covenant would provide somewhat broader protection than
a no solicitation agreement, which the California courts have interpreted as barring direct solicitation of
business, but not indirect solicitation by means of the announcement of the employee’s new position.  It
would also parallel the distinction drawn by invention law based on whether written corroboration has
triggered conception.  See text accompanying notes 61-64,  supra.  Such a narrow scope for the trade secret
exception would leave outside the doctrinal accommodation trade secrets involving tacit knowledge and the
like which are at the heart of Silicon Valley’s knowledge spillover based agglomeration economy.
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applied to post-employment covenants not to compete by other industrial states may be
flexible enough to allow for this kind of industry by industry approach.  In assessing the
validity of a particular covenant under this legal regime, a court balances against the
employer’s interest in enforcing the covenant not only the employee’s interest in
mobility, but also the public interest.132  At least at the doctrinal level, this formulation
invites the court to take into account the public interest in a potential agglomeration
economy associated with knowledge spillovers in a particular industry, and invites the
parties to present expert testimony concerning the knowledge structure of the industry
involved.
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson provide some guidance about how such an
inquiry might proceed.133  Patent law in general, and the appropriate scope of a patent in
particular, present an issue roughly analogous to that presented by the scope of protection
provoided by the law governing trade secrets and covenants not to compete.  In patent
law, encouraging innovation by protecting property rights in an invention through a broad
patent scope inevitably conflicts with an alternative means to encourage innovation.  A
narrow patent scope encourages innovation by making it easier for subsequent investors
to improve existing patented technology.  In trade secret law, encouraging innovation
through a broad scope for trade secret protection -- that is, by augmenting trade secret law
through enforcing covenants not to compete and thereby protecting tacit knowledge and
pre-conception inventions -- also conflicts with an alternative means to encourage
innovation.  A narrow scope for trade secret protection, as with California's prohibition of
                                               
132 See text accompanying notes 65-70, supra.
133 Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUMBIA L.REV.
839 (1990).
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post-employment covenants not to compete, facilitates second stage agglomeration
economies by leaving tacit knowledge and pre-conception inventions unprotected.
Merges and Nelson argue that the proper patent scope depends on the nature of
innovation in particular industries.  Two of their categories of innovation are instructive
for our purpose.  The first is "discrete innovation," in which the invention's boundaries
are clear and, although subject to improvement, the invention is clearly not the first step
in a series of important technical advances.  The ballpoint pen is offered as an example of
this type of invention.  The second is "cumulative technologies," in which innovation is
additive in the sense that it can be anticipated that fundamental technological advances
are both possible and will build on existing technology.  "Over time dramatic advance
occurs in these technologies from improvements to one aspect or another, adding this
new feature or that."134  Computers are an example of this type of technology.
Building on this typology, Merges and Nelson argue that a broad patent scope is
appropriate in industries characterized by discrete innovation; encouraging initial
discovery by expansive property rights incurs little offsetting cost by discouraging
follow-on innovation.  In contrast, a narrow patent scope is appropriate in industries
characterized by cumulative technologies; the gains from encouraging follow-on
innovation exceed the costs of reduced incentives for initial invention.  The same analysis
may be appropriate with respect to trade secret protection.  Because Silicon Valley
appears to be characterized by cumulative technologies, California's narrow scope of
trade secret protection, effected by prohibiting covenants not to compete, would be just
about right.
                                               
134 Id. at 881.
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Thus, it may well be that a state concerned with regional development today
should not blindly seek to replicate the historical source of Silicon Valley’s success.
Given the opportunity to act by design rather than by historical accident, the better
approach may be to craft a legal infrastructure that has the flexibility to accommodate the
different balance between external economies and intellectual property rights protection
that may be optimal in different industries. In contrast, for California, where the industrial
distribution already reflects the long-term presence of Business and Professions Code §
16600, the best course may simply be staying the course.
